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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
NATURAL RESOURCE, REGIONAL GROWTH, AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION 
The dissertation research will comprise three essays on the topic of the resource curse 
hypothesis and its mechanisms. The phenomenon of low economic growth in resource-
rich regions is recognized as the “resource curse”. These essays will contribute to an 
understanding of the regional resource-growth relation within a nation.  
Essay one tests the resource curse hypothesis at the U.S. state level. With a system of 
equations model, I decompose the overall resource effect to account for the two leading 
explanations — crowding-out and institution effects, thus investigate whether the 
institutions mediate the crowding-out effects. I did not find evidence of an overall 
negative effect on growth by resource wealth. Both the crowding-out and institution 
appear present, but they offset: the resource boom crowds out industrial investments, but 
good institutions mitigate the overall effect. Resources do reduce growth in states with 
low-quality institutions, including Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. 
Essay two compares the effects of resource revenues on the economic growth and 
growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and American states, using panel data 
from 1990 to 2015. With the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy, I show that regions with 
higher resource revenues grow faster than other regions in both China and the U.S. The 
positive resource effect is larger and more statistically significant in the U.S.  Further 
testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g. the market price reform, 
the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show that the market price 
reform together with the privatization process on coal resources contribute the positive 
resource effect in China. Though strong and positive resource – growth relations appear 
in both countries, evidence also suggests consistent negative resource effects on certain 
growth-related factors in both countries, such as educational attainments and R&D 
activities. 
Essay three explores the schooling response to the oil and gas boom, taking advantage of 
timing and spatial variation in oil and gas well drilling activities. Development of cost-
reducing technologies at the time of higher crude oil and natural gas prices in the early 
2000s has accelerated shale oil and gas extraction in the United States. I show that 
intensive drilling activities have decreased grade 11 and 12 enrollment over the 14 year 
study window − approximately 36 fewer students per county on average and overall, 
41,760 fewer students across the 15 states enrolled considered in the analysis. On 
average, with one additional oil or gas well drilled per thousand initial laborers, grade 11 
and 12 enrollment would decrease 0.24 percent at the county level, all else equal.  I 
investigate heterogeneous effects and show that the implied effect of the boom is larger in 
states with a younger compulsory schooling age requirement (16 years of age instead of 
17 or 18), lower state-level effective tax rate on oil and gas productions, traditional 
mining, non-metro, and persistent poverty counties. 
KEYWORDS: Resource Curse, Economic Growth, the United States, China, Energy 
Boom, High School Enrollment  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Many economically important commodities could be described as natural resources – 
land, oil, coal, ores, fish populations, and so on. Economic growth depends on production 
factors, such as capital, labor, and natural resources. However, does resource wealth 
promote economic development? Counter-intuitively, some of the fastest growing 
economies over recent decades are regions with little natural wealth, whereas some 
countries with enormous resources suffer from poor economic performance, such as 
Angola, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The phenomenon that resource-
rich regions develop less quickly, called the resource curse, was formally presented by 
Auty in 1993 and has become “one of the most intriguing puzzles in economic 
development and a great example of how organized empirical observations can guide 
economic theory and inform policy” (James and Aadland, 2011 pp440).  
    Empirical tests of the resource curse hypothesis started with cross-country studies and 
led to no consensus conclusions. Some economists observed the resource curse as a 
general phenomenon in a large sample of countries from the 1960s to 2000s (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; et al.) while others have refuted the resource 
curse hypothesis (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; et al.).  It is not surprising that effects 
of natural resources on the economy vary from country to country and across different 
episodes in history. However, the inconsistent empirical results could also reflect biases 
lying in cross-country analyses. Country-level observations offer significant variations in 
resource endowments, and economic growths, which facilitate the analysis. Yet many 
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confounding features, such as geography, culture, and institution quality, also exist and 
could potentially bias the results, especially in cross-sectional analysis. The concern 
persists with panel-data given the time-varying hard-to-measure factors like 
macroeconomic policies. To address concerns in cross-country studies, this dissertation 
exploits variation within a country, where variables that might confound the relationship 
between resources and macroeconomic outcomes do not vary and the danger of spurious 
correlation is minimized.  
    Two main explanations for the resource curse have been proposed. The crowding-out 
effect suggests that resource wealth crowds out growth-inducing factors such as 
investment, human capital, innovation and so on. The institution effect argues that 
whether resource wealth is a curse or not depends on the governance quality in the 
resource-rich region. Good institutions mediate the potential curse. Both explanations 
have been supported by empirical work (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999 and 2001; 
Mehlum et al., 2006; Michaels, 2011; Boschini et al., 2013). In literature, the crowding-
out effect and the institution effect have been tested separately or not at all. In Chapter 
two, this gap is addressed by decomposing the resource effect into direct effect, 
crowding-out effect, and institution effect in the U.S. 
    Regional level analyses reduce the danger of spurious correlations by analyzing 
subnational regions facing the same economic system, institution arrangement, 
macroeconomic policies, and less various cultures and institutional qualities. The tradeoff 
is to forgo opportunities of testing impacts from persistent features, such as the economic 
system and institution arrangement. Chapter three explores the role of economic systems 
in the resource – growth relation with a comparison analysis between China and the U.S.  
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    Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies have induced an oil and gas 
drilling boom in the U.S. since the 2000s. Oil and gas extraction has rapidly increased 
from shale formations. Comparing to conventional gas deposits which are in permeable 
rocks typically located much closer to the surface, the shale deposits are trapped in fine-
grained sedimentary rocks with very low permeability and located 1,000 to 13,500 feet 
below the surface (Joskow 2013). According to U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), hydraulic fracturing (commonly called "fracking" or "fracing") is a technique in 
which water, chemicals, and sand are pumped into the well to unlock the hydrocarbons 
trapped in shale formations by opening cracks (fractures) in the rock and allowing natural 
gas to flow from the shale into the well. When used in conjunction with horizontal 
drilling, hydraulic fracturing enables gas producers to extract shale gas economically. 
Simply, fracking is to produce natural gas from shale rock by bombarding it with water 
and chemicals.  
    The increase in oil and gas related employment is the other side of the shale gas boom. 
Many new jobs related to the energy boom are task-skill based – meaning that education 
and work experience requirements for entry are low – and have the potential to raise the 
opportunity cost of schooling significantly. During energy boom periods, increased 
demand for and earnings of task-skill labor with low education requirements could widen 
the wage differential and increase the opportunity cost of staying in school, thus drawing 
teenagers out of school (Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005b; Emery, Ferrer and Green 
2012). Chapter four exploits variation in timing and spatial patterns of oil and gas well 
drilling activities across 15 American states since the 2000s to investigate the schooling 
impact of the rent shale oil and gas boom. 
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1.2. Objectives and Structure 
The objectives of this dissertation are four-fold. The first is to test the resource curse 
hypothesis within the U.S. and China. Second, investigate the mechanisms, e.g. the 
crowding-out effect and the institution effect, in the U.S. to shed light on the meditation 
strategies to the “cursed” regions. Then compare the U.S. and China case to draw insights 
on how the distinct economic systems could alter the resource – growth relation. Finally, 
take advantage of the shale oil and gas boom in the U.S. and investigate the impact of 
resource booms on schooling decisions.   
    Chapter two tests whether a resource curse exists in the U.S. and further decomposing 
the resource effect into direct effect, crowding-out effect, and institution effect.  A panel 
data set of 50 states from 1997 to 2014 with a system of equations model. It contributes 
to the literature with the decomposition of the overall resource effect thus investigates the 
two mechanisms simultaneously.  
    Chapter three uses comparable measures to examine the effects of resource revenues 
on the economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and 
American states from 1990 to 2015. For economies in transition, such as China, weak 
price signals and prevailing state ownership likely lead to inefficient resource allocation, 
leaving a weak or even negative resource-growth relation. The main goal of this chapter 
is to illustrate this argument using comparative regional-level analysis of the resource 
wealth impacts in China and the United States. It contributes to the literature with the first 
comparison piece between Chinese provinces and the U.S. states on testing the resource-
growth relation. Several resource-related policies during the study period in China, such 
as the market price reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, 
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provide variations in China’s transition to a market economy. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is also the first study in the China literature to link and empirically test 
impacts of market price reforms and the fiscal reform in the resource-growth relation.     
    Chapter four exploits county and year variation in drilling activities across 1170 
counties in 15 oil and gas production states in the U.S. between 2000 and 2013. The 
instrumental variable approach with various fixed effects provides estimates of how this 
recent oil and gas boom affected high school enrollment at the county level. It improves 
the literature by drawing on rich well drilling data at an annual frequency that both 
identifies the location, timing, and intensity of the oil and gas boom and allows me to 
explore heterogeneous effects. Chapter five closes the dissertation discussing conclusions 
and applications. 
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Chapter 2 Do Institutions Mediate the Crowding-out Effects? The Resource Curse 
Revisited at the U.S. State Level 
2.1. Introduction  
Economic growth depends on production factors, such as capital, labor, and natural 
resources. However, does resource wealth promote economic development? Counter-
intuitively, some of the fastest growing economies over recent decades are regions with 
little natural wealth, whereas some countries with enormous resources suffer from poor 
economic performance, such as Angola, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The phenomenon that resource-rich regions develop less quickly, called the resource 
curse, was formally presented by Auty in 1993 and has become “one of the most 
intriguing puzzles in economic development and a great example of how organized 
empirical observations can guide economic theory and inform policy” (James and 
Aadland, 2011 pp440).  
    Two main explanations for the resource curse have been proposed. The crowding-out 
effect suggests that resource wealth crowds out growth-inducing factors such as 
investment, human capital, innovation and so on. The institution effect argues that 
whether resource wealth is a curse or not depends on the governance quality in the 
resource-rich region. Good institutions mediate the potential curse. Both explanations 
have been supported by empirical work (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999 and 2001; 
Mehlum et al., 2006; Michaels, 2011; Boschini et al., 2013).  
    While the resource curse literature began with cross-country analysis, within-country 
evidence has also emerged (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; Corey, 2009; Weber, 2013).  
However, the crowding-out effect and the institution effect have been tested separately or 
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not at all. In this study, I address this gap in the literature by investigating whether a 
resource curse exists in the U.S. and further decomposing the resource effect into direct 
effect, crowding-out effect, and institution effect.  I analyze a panel data set of 50 states 
from 1997 to 2014 with a system of equations model and find that both the crowding-out 
effect and the institution mediation contribute to the resource-growth relation, but that the 
net resource effect is positive or neutral. In other words, I did not find evidence of a 
general resource curse for U.S. states and good institutions do mediate the crowding-out 
effect. The results are robust to different institution measures, model specifications, and 
econometric approaches. To my best knowledge, this study is the first attempt to test both 
effects simultaneously. A system of equations model with both state and year fixed 
effects allows  me to test various resource effects systematically, and further addresses 
the endogeneity due to time-invariant omitted variables and the simultaneous co-
movements among macro-variables at the U.S. state level.  
2.2. Literature Review 
2.2.1. Resource Curse across countries   
Are natural resources a curse or a blessing? The empirical evidence is diverse: some 
economists observed the resource curse as a general phenomenon in a large sample of 
countries from the 1960s to 2000s (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 
2004; et al.). However, others have refuted the resource curse hypothesis 
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; et al.).  In fact, the same author could claim two 
opposing views in different studies: Bulte et al. (2005) used resource exports over total 
exports as a proxy for resource abundance and found that resource-intensive countries 
tend to suffer lower levels of human development. However, with a similar sample and 
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time frame, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) claimed that the resource curse might be a 
red herring because the commonly used measure of “resource abundance” is a proxy for 
“resource dependence,” which is endogenous to underlying structural factors. Using total 
natural capital and subsoil assets as measures, they found that resource abundance 
positively affects growth.  As summarized in Van der Ploeg (2011), the effects of natural 
resources on the economy vary from country to country and across different episodes in 
history. 
2.2.2. Are resources a curse? Crowding-out effect and institutions  
Economists have developed two main mechanisms to explain the resource curse: the 
crowding-out effect and the institution explanation. (See Van der Ploeg, 2011) 
     Crowding-out can be summarized as resource abundance reducing activity X, where X 
drives growth. Different crowding-out stories focus on different X activities. Sachs and 
Warner (1995, 1999, and 2001) applied a Dutch Disease model, in which X is the 
manufacture of traded goods. The extra wealth generated by the sale of natural resources 
induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate so that natural resource windfalls cause 
deindustrialization (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984). This model assumes that 
learning by doing in the manufacturing sector is the key driver of growth.  Other growth-
driving activities that may be crowded out by natural resource wealth include education 
(Gylfason, 2001; Stijns, 2006), knowledge creation (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004), and 
investment (Beck, 2011).  
    No matter which X factors are examined, the crowding-out explanation suggests that 
the problem lies in resources themselves: the production function of the resource sector is 
inferior due to lack of knowledge accumulation (Sachs and Warner, 1995) or fewer 
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backward or forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958). Though a resource boom brings out 
higher returns at first, it drags the economy into a lower growth path in the long run. This 
explanation, however, does not explain notable counter-examples, such as Norway and 
Botswana.  
The institution explanation suggests that whether resources are blessed or cursed 
depends on the quality of institutions. Mehlum et al. (2006a, 2006b) modeled a resource-
abundant economy with an allocation of entrepreneurial activity between production and 
grabbing (i.e., rent-seeking), affected by the quality of institutions. They used Sachs and 
Warner’s dataset to test the institution explanation and concluded that institutions are 
decisive for the effect of resources. Boschini et al. (2007 and 2013) also concluded that 
mineral-rich countries are cursed only if they have low-quality institutions (e.g., 
dysfunctional legal system and low transparency).  
Further, resource revenues may encourage bad institutional practices, such as imperfect 
markets, poorly functioning legal systems, buying off the opposition, or overspending on 
public service employment (Gelb, 1988; Auty, 2001a; Ross, 1999; Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte, 2008). In particular, point resources (e.g., minerals and fossil fuels) generate 
concentrated production and revenue patterns, which are more likely to be controlled by 
relatively small groups of society, exhibiting so-called “executive discretion in revenue 
allocation” (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). Murshed (2004) argued that point resources 
(e.g., agriculture, forestry) tend to breed rent-seeking behaviors and harm political 
institutions, while diffuse resources are better, and manufactured goods are the best for 
the development of good governance institutions. In contrast, Tompson (2005) studied 
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the political implications of Russia’s resource-based economy and concluded that 
attribution of Russia’s politics to its resource-based economy was unconvincing.  
The preceding argument lies in the crowding-out camp even though it also recognized 
institutions as the crucial link. With the crowding-out effect, institutional quality is 
another growth-driving factor X that is retarded by resource abundance, whereas the 
institution explanation focuses on ex-ante institutional quality. In this latter narrative, 
resource rents could either be captured by interest groups for personal enrichment or be 
allocated into a productive economy, and the choice depends on institutional qualities. 
Indeed, the source of the windfall (e.g., natural resources or foreign aid) is irrelevant—it 
is a revenue curse due to bad institutions rather than a resource curse (Morrison, 2010).  
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, and Botswana are all examples of 
countries in which strong institutions have made resource abundance a blessing, rather 
than a curse (Acemoglu et al., 2003).  
2.2.3. Within-country variation on resource curse 
Subnational studies of the resource curse take advantage of less variation in factors that 
might confound the relationship between resources and macroeconomic outcomes, 
reducing the danger of spurious correlations. At the U.S. state level, both Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2007) and Corey (2009) confirmed the resource curse, but the former explained 
it with crowding-out effects and the latter supported the institution explanation. At the 
U.S. county level, Michaels (2011) showed evidence that oil abundance increased local 
employment in both the mining and manufacturing sectors and that the South’s oil 
endowment helped to overcome its slow start, rather than impede its growth, compared to 
the North’s. Weber (2013) reached a similar conclusion on natural gas development since 
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2000. However, James and Aadland (2011) investigated 3,092 U.S. counties and showed 
clear evidence of a resource curse.  
Factor mobilities are higher within a country than across countries. The spatial 
equilibrium model suggests that people “vote with their feet” and that high income can be 
interpreted as compensation for negative site-specific attributes (Roback, 1982; Glaeser 
and Gottlieb, 2008). As a result, income may not be a good proxy for state or local 
wellbeing. Change in employment, population, and poverty rate are used as alternative 
measures (Weber 2012 and 2013; Partridge et al., 2013). Spatial modeling is further 
applied to consider other neighbor effects within a country (Weber 2013). In this study, I 
focus on the growth rate of state per capita income, to be consistent with the original 
resource curse hypothesis proposed by Auty and make results comparable to the 
literature. I further check the robustness with alternative dependent variables like state 
population growth and additional spatial analyses.  
I contribute to the literature by using U.S. state-level panel data in a system of 
equations to test the resource curse hypothesis. I decompose the overall resource impact 
into the direct effect, the crowding-out effect, and the institution effect, thus investigating 
the two mechanisms simultaneously. At the county level, the lack of data on institution 
proxies prevents investigation of the institution explanation. At the state level, previous 
studies have independently tested the two mechanisms. Also, these studies rely on cross-
sectional data, whereas my use of panel data models can control for state-specific effects, 
thus reducing omitted variable bias.  
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2.3. Empirical Model and Data 
The empirical analyses aim to test the resource curse hypothesis at the U.S. state level 
and its two mechanisms, the crowding-out effect, and the institution effect.   
2.3.1. Resource wealth and growth 
A system of equations is proposed to identify and decompose the resource-growth 
relation:  
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1ln(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝛃𝛃′𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (1) 
𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛂𝛂0 + 𝛂𝛂1ln(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛂𝛂2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐒𝐒𝑖𝑖 + 𝐓𝐓𝑖𝑖 + 𝛍𝛍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                                                      (2) 
Subscripts i and t indicate state and time, respectively. Equation (1) implements the 
income convergence growth model in the growth and resource curse literature (e.g., 
Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995 
and 1999a; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004 and 2007; et al.). G is annual growth in real per 
capita income, and Inc is annual real per capita income. The natural log of per capita 
income with one period lag (𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1) controls for the initial income level and a 
negative 𝛽𝛽1 would imply conditional income convergence in growth. R is resource 
wealth. The interaction term between resource wealth and institutional quality 
(Institution) identifies the institution effect (Mehlum et al., 2006a and 2006b; Boschini et 
al., 2013): the marginal effect of natural resources on growth is conditional on the level 
of institutional quality, given by (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). A positive 𝛽𝛽3 signals that a 
sufficiently high level of the institutional quality can offset the potentially negative 𝛽𝛽2, 
thus break the curse. I call it the institution effect. X is a matrix of growth-related 
variables including investment, human capital, and R&D.  𝛃𝛃′ is the vector of coefficients 
on different growth-related variables aforementioned. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is a state-specific fixed effect for 
13 
 
each state i. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is the dummy variable for year, which allows for nationwide shocks and 
growth trends over time not otherwise accounted for by the explanatory variables.  
The crowding-out effect was tested by regressing growth-friendly factors (X) on the 
resource variable as specified in equation (2) (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh, 2007; Shao and Qi, 2009).  Since matrix X consists of three vectors: investment, 
human capital, and R&D intensity, (1) and (2) constitute a system of four equations.  A 
negative α2 implies that factor 𝑋𝑋 decreases with the resource abundance level so that x is 
crowded-out by resources.   
To test crowding-out and institution effects systematically and fully identify the 
resource-growth relation, I substitute equation (2) into equation (1) and obtain the 
reduced form equation (3): 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝛄𝛄′𝛍𝛍𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,   
(3) 
Where   𝛾𝛾0 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂0;  
             𝛾𝛾1 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂1; 
             𝛾𝛾2 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2;  
             𝛾𝛾3 = 𝛽𝛽3;  
             𝛄𝛄′ = 𝛃𝛃′ 
Both 𝛃𝛃′ and 𝛂𝛂 are vectors of coefficients and 𝛍𝛍𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is a vector of residuals from equation 
(2). Finally, the overall marginal effect of natural resources on growth is given by 
equation (4): 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅� = 𝛾𝛾2 + 𝛾𝛾3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,                      (4) 
14 
 
Four testable hypotheses are parameterized in equation (4). The general resource curse 
would be reflected by a negative coefficient for the overall impact of resource wealth on 
growth ( 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
). This impact is decomposed into three effects: the direct effect (𝛽𝛽2), the 
crowding-out effects (𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 ), and the institution effect (𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖).  While 
theory has not suggested a specific sign on the direct effect 𝛽𝛽2, a negative 𝛂𝛂2  multiplying 
a positive 𝛃𝛃′ implies a crowding-out effect on growth-inducing factors, and a positive 𝛽𝛽3 
signals the institution effect that mediates any potential negative effect. The overall 
resource effect depends on the sign, magnitude, and significance of all three effects.  The 
decomposition differentiates this study from other empirical specifications. The resource 
curse literature either estimated equation (1) only and tested the direct and the institution 
effect, or investigated the crowding-out mechanism without the interaction between 
resource wealth and institutional  quality (e.g. Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004 and 2007).  
The system of equations model allows me to decompose the overall resource effects and 
test both effects simultaneously. 
A system of equations with panel data can be estimated with single equation approach, 
such as applying panel estimators (e.g. Fixed Effect), equation-by-equation, or with 
system estimators such as three-stage least squares (3SLS). The single equation approach 
assumes that (i) all regressors are exogenous, and (ii) correlations among errors in the 
system are zero. When these assumptions are likely to be violated, 3SLS allows 
correlation among errors and endogenous regressors. I report the results of both 
approaches. State and year fixed effects are controlled in each equation. With the 3SLS 
estimator, the system is identified with both included and excluded instruments. The 
included instruments are natural log of real per capita personal income with a one-year 
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lag, resource wealth with a one-year lag, ex-ante institutional quality measures, state and 
year dummies. Moreover, two-year lagged investment, human capital, and R&D density 
are employed as excluded instruments1. In addition to my main analysis, I report a 
number of diagnostic tests following the 3SLS regression, and I further check robustness 
by employing alternative econometric approaches incorporating dynamic and spatial 
dimensions. These results are discussed in Section 2.5.  
2.3.2. Justification for the covariates and the measure 
2.3.2.1. Measuring resource wealth 
Table 1 lists variable definitions and descriptive statistics. In my baseline analysis, my 
measure of resource wealth is Resource_point, which is the share of gross state product 
(GSP) derived from the extraction of point resource (i.e., mining sector). According to 
the literature, point resources are more likely to contribute to the resource curse (Jensen 
and Wantchekon, 2004; Murshed, 2004). However, I also examine alternative measures: 
Resource_diffuse is the GSP share from the extraction of the diffuse resource (i.e., 
agriculture, fishing, and forestry), while Resource_oil&gas, Resource_coal&metal, and 
Resource_supportactivities are measures that further segment the GSP share from point 
resources. In the 2000s, the U.S. has experienced large increases in the extraction of oil 
and natural gas from shale, while coal extraction has declined. Analysis of the last two 
                                                          
 
1 Ideally, I would like one unique explanatory variable for each of the three equations in (2) to obtain 
sufficient exclusion restrictions. However, under the specification with both state and year fixed effects, 
explanatory power is already very high for the investment, human capital and R&D equations (R2 are all 
above 90%). The panel setting (i.e., annual variation) makes it difficult to obtain such explanatory 
variables. Thus I apply two-year lagged investment, human capital, and R&D expenditure as excluded 
instruments, and they all pass various diagnostic tests as discussed in the text. 
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measures allows me to consider the effects of this trend and the differing technologies 
associated with these different resources.    
These variables are flow measures equivalent to the share of natural resources in 
export or GDP in cross-countries studies (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Mehlum et al., 2006a 
and 2006b; Boschini et al., 2013). Other studies have employed stock measures such as 
the share of natural capital in total capital or the value of subsoil assets (Alexeev and 
Conrad, 2009, Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, Gylfason, 2001; Hodler, 2006).  I agree 
that it is important to distinguish between resource “endowments” (e.g., the stock 
measures) and resource “dependency” (e.g., the flow measures)2. I also agree that stock 
measures suffer fewer problems with endogeneity3. However, I believe that it is when 
resources come into the production process and the resource rents are realized that they 
are most likely to influence growth. Unexploited resources may connect with economic 
performance tenuously. As Boschini et al. (2013) pointed out, when politicians face some 
trade-off between grabbing the resources today or developing other sectors in expecting 
more future gains, or when an individual choose to work in the booming resource sector 
rather than investing in education, “it is the share that resources makeup of the economy 
at the point of deciding that matters” (page 21).  
Regardless of these important aspects, flow measures may be viewed as conditionally 
exogenous. First, mining activity is highly related to resource availability, which is 
                                                          
 
2 The distinction was first made in Stijins (2005) and later developed by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). 
3 As van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) pointed out, resource reserve measures are not necessarily 
exogenous since countries that have long been industrialized or with better institutions are more likely to 
have explored and found more of their reserves. In the subnational case though, reserves across a country 
seem more exogenous due to homogeneous exploration technology across states.  
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geologically exogenous4. Second, the main criticism of flow measures in the literature is 
that economic policies and institutions may influence resource dependency. For example, 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) suggested that sectoral lobbying can alter policies. In 
some studies (e.g., Weber, 2013), this endogeneity is addressed by use of geological 
instruments, such as the percent of the region covering an oil or gas formation, but this 
approach is precluded by my use of state fixed effects. Instead, I check the sensitivity of 
my results to endogeneity with the Added Controls Approach (ACA) by including 
proxies for lobbying and rent-seeking behaviors. These results are discussed in Section 
2.5. 
2.3.2.2. Measuring institutional quality 
Several aspects of institutions have been studied in the resource curse context.  One 
division is between “rules” and “institutional outcomes” (Boschini et al., 2013)5. Rules 
refer to constraints on governance or the executive, such as constitutional arrangements, 
the degree of democracy, or trade restrictions. Institutional outcomes, in contrast, reflect 
government actions. In cross-country studies, scholars have employed several standard 
indices to indicate both sides of institutional quality6.  In my study, measures of 
institutional “rules” are unlikely to show much variation across U.S. states. I, therefore, 
                                                          
 
4 In fact, many studies has employed exogenous geological factors to instrument resource dependence 
(Weber, 2012 and 2013; Borge et al., 2013), which suggests that most part of the resource production is 
exogenous and related to the exogenous resource availability rather than other factors.  
5 In the same line, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) differentiate between institutions as “durable 
constraints” and “changeable policy outcomes”.  In the institution literature but not the resource curse 
context, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) distinguish between economic and political institutions, capturing a 
similar point. Also see Glaeser et al. (2004) and Persson (2005) 
6 Indicators for “institution rules” include the degree of democracy from Polity IV data set (Murshed, 
2004); for “institutional outcomes” include rule of law and government effectiveness measured by the 
World Bank (Bulte et al., 2005), various country risk indices from the International Country Risk Guide 
(Mehlum et al., 2004; Boschini et al., 2007; et al.) and transparency (Williams, 2011). 
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focus on the “institutional outcomes” dimension. Based on literature and available data, I 
use four indices of institutional quality: a constructed government efficiency index, 
public official corruption convictions, the score of state liability systems by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, and the Economic Freedom of North America Index (EFNA) by 
the Fraser Institute. I use the first measure in my baseline analysis, and investigate the 
institution effect in detail with all four proxies. 
  For my first measure of institutional quality, I constructed an index of government 
efficiency following Borge et al. (2008), Borge et al. (2013) and Andrews and Brewer 
(2013). The output of each state government is measured by the z-scores for 15 indicators 
across five public service sectors: Education, Health, Highways, Public Safety, and 
Environment (accounting for 89% of direct general expenditures in 2010)7. These scores 
are weighted by the sector expenditure shares and summed. The index then divides this 
output measure by the real revenue per capita received by state and local governments, 
reflecting inputs to the public sector8. This index reflects, to some extent, government 
behavior to allocate rent, thus hinting whether the economy is a producer- or grabber-
friendly.  
The second measure, the number of state public official corruption convictions per 
1,000 elected officials (data from the U.S. Department of Justice9), measures rent-seeking 
                                                          
 
7 Calculated from “State and Local Government Finances Summary: 2010”, table A-1 “State and Local 
Government Finances by Level of Government: 2010”, http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/g10-
alfin.pdf 
8 Details of the index construction and data are provided in Appendix A 1.2. 
9 The Public Integrity Section of U.S. Department of Justice surveys the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
nationwide annually on public corruption, defined as crimes involving abuses of the public trust by 
government officials. The statistics are published in the annual Report to Congress on the Activities and 
Operations of the Public Integrity Section. 
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behavior directly. Third, the score of state liability systems comes from the 2002 State 
Liability System Ranking Study, a survey of 1,482 in-house general counsel, senior 
litigators or attorneys, and other senior executives. It explores how reasonable, fair, and 
balanced the state tort liability systems are perceived to be by U.S. business. Finally, the 
Economic Freedom of North America Index (EFNA) indicates the degree of government 
intervention in the economy beyond its protective function. The government collects 
resource rent and expand. Although some would argue that a larger public sector is a drag 
on economic growth, that threat is reduced when institutional quality is high, and 
government revenues are used for the economically efficient provision of public goods. 
The Government Efficiency Index captures these government behaviors on productivity, 
while the Economic Freedom Index considers government expansion only. Thus, the 
Government Efficiency Index is my preferred institutional quality measure. 
  With the institution effect, whether resource wealth is a blessing or a curse depends 
on institutional quality when the resource rent is realized. To address endogeneity 
concerns, I use a time-invariant measure for each of the four variables discussed above. 
Specifically, I use the average value of the variable over several years (based on data 
availability, see Table 1) prior to the start of my other data series. In my panel data 
setting, the state fixed effects preclude an estimation of the marginal effects of the 
institutional quality variables themselves. However, by including the interaction term  
(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) in equation (1), I can still test for the institution effect as a 
moderator of the resource curse.  
In addition to the pre-determined institutional quality measures, I further address the 
endogeneity issue in several ways. First, any time-invariant omitted variables, such as 
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state geographical characteristics, are captured in the state fixed effect term, si, for which 
the fixed effect estimator correct.  Then, I employ the statistics introduced by Altonji et 
al. (2005 and 2008)10 to test for bias caused by unobserved time-varying factors. Since 
the test statistics can be conducted only in a single-equation setting, I report it in the 
sensitivity analysis with the fixed effect and first difference models. 
2.3.2.3. Other covariates 
The vectors in 𝐗𝐗  (investment, human capital, and R&D) play two roles in the analysis. 
First, they are used as controls in the growth regression (equation 1). Second, in the 
resource curse context, each factor is a channel possibly linking resource wealth to 
growth.  In other words, they are factors potentially crowded-out by resource wealth. 
Although the issue of resources affecting institutions is discussed at length in the 
literature, I omit institutional quality as a crowded-out factor in this analysis. First, the 
crowding-out of institutions may be most relevant in the long run, which annual 
variations in the data would hardly reflect. Second, I have chosen to mitigate endogeneity 
issues by using time-invariant measures of prior institutional quality, which is exogenous 
to contemporary resource production. Thus, I can address the importance of institutions 
in mitigating the resource curse but not the crowding-out of institutional quality.  
 The first potentially crowded-out factor is the investment. Anticipating a stream of 
returns from the natural resource, an agent has less desire to invest in man-made capital 
for future periods (Corden, 1984; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006). A wage premium in the 
                                                          
 
10 Please refer to Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2002, 2005 and 2008) for more details on the methodology. I 
sincerely appreciate Dr. Elder (Northwestern University) for generously discussing the Altonji-Elder-Taber 
statistics and sharing the STATA code. 
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resource sector, for example, can signify the reallocation of production factors from the 
manufacturing sector to the booming resource sector (Sachs and Warner 2001).  While an 
expanding resource sector could crowd out the manufacturing sector, the investment on 
the margin is more likely to be reallocated into the resource sector. The manufacturing 
sector is often characterized by increasing returns to scale and positive externalities 
(forward and backward linkages).  A decline in the scale of the manufacturing further 
decreases the productivity of investments, which accelerates the decrease in investments 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995 and 1999a; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 
2007).  Moreover, the volatility of the resource revenue creates uncertainty for investors 
in resource economies (Sachs and Warner, 1999b).  At the U.S. state level, data on the 
gross investment (public and private) by the state is not available. I follow Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2007) and use the share of industrial machinery production in GSP as a measure 
of investment. 
The second factor is human capital, long recognized as an important factor to 
economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Mankiw et al., 1992) and a channel causing the resource 
curse (Gylfason, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; Shao and 
Qi, 2009). Resource abundance may discourage both private and public incentives to 
accumulate human capital due to short-sighted behaviors. With higher wage and non-
wage incomes related to the resource abundance in the short term, individuals or public 
sectors of high discount rates become less motivated in investing in human capital 
(Gylfason and Zoega, 2006). At the same time, the typically low skill requirements and 
high pay for labor in the resource sector further reduce returns to education with a 
resource boom (Gylfason, 2001). These imply a crowding-out of human capital. 
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Different measures of human capital have been used in the literature.  Some focus on 
education inputs, such as public expenditure on education (Gylfason, 2001), the share of 
educational services in gross state product (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007), and gross 
secondary-school enrollment (Gylfason, 2001). Education input measures ignore the 
effect of labor mobility on the regional human capital stock, and thus on regional growth. 
While cross-country research is less concerned with labor movement, the effect could be 
significant within a country, especially the U.S. (Weber, 2013). Other indicators measure 
regional human capital endowment and use educational attainment in the population, 
such as the share of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree (James and Aadland, 
2011; Weber, 2013). I use the latter measurement to account for a more direct effect of 
the human capital stock on regional growth11.  
Third, research and development (R&D) activities promote economic growth with 
technology and productivity improvements.   As with investment, a flow of wealth from 
natural resources may harm the incentive to innovate for long run benefit; i.e., natural 
resource abundance may crowd out innovation12 (Sachs and Warner, 2001). I use each 
state’s R&D intensity, which is the ratio of total R&D performed both from private and 
public sectors in a state to its GSP, to indicate the state innovation level.  In the case 
when R&D occurs in one state but is applied in other states, this measure omits the 
                                                          
 
11 I also replaced the human capital stock measure with an education measure, state high school graduation 
rate, and re-estimated the model. The results are consistent and can be provided upon request. 
12 The resource sector directly contributes to R&D expenditures, e.g. the development of horizontal drilling 
technology in unconventional oil and gas extraction. However, R&D expenditures in oil and gas 
exploration and development counts only 0.0.54% to 1.49% of the overall R&D expenditures in the U.S. 
during my sample periods (authors calculated based on data from U.S. Energy Information Administration 
and National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics). This should 
mitigate any concern on the autocorrelation between R&D expenditures and oil and gas development. 
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growth effect of applying R&D outside own state thus fails to capture the complete 
growth effect. The degree of omitted variable bias will be tested with Altonji-Elder-Taber 
statistics aforementioned.  
2.3.3. Data description 
The panel dataset covers the 50 U.S. states from 1997 to 2014. Data for R&D activities 
come from National Patterns of R&D Resources, and other data are from the U.S. Census 
Bureau. The time range of this study starts from 1997 partly because the U.S. Census 
Bureau has replaced the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) with the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) since 1997. Most variables contain 900 
observations (Table 1-1). 
Across the sample, the average annual growth in real per capita personal income is 
1.29%, while the average fraction of earnings from both diffuse and point resource 
sectors is 4.52%. The variation in point resource specialization is substantial. On the low 
end, Delaware has experienced approximately zero point resource extraction in 2011, 
2012 and 2014, while Alaska derived 40.71% of earnings from point resource extraction 
in 1997.  Average mining earnings exceed 10% of the GSP in five states: Wyoming 
(29.97%), Alaska (25.84%), West Virginia (12.53%), Louisiana (11.15%), and Oklahoma 
(10.00%), compared to the sample mean of 3.06%.  
The Government Efficiency Index shows considerable variation. On average from 
1990 to 1995, the most efficient state and local government is New Hampshire, with an 
index of 1.84, meaning the state and local governments there are 1.84 standard deviations 
higher than the mean. Other states with an index higher than 1 are Wisconsin (1.52), 
North Dakota (1.43), Vermont (1.42), Minnesota (1.22), Montana (1.16) and Iowa (1.15), 
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and the states with an index lower than -1 are Mississippi (-2.25), Louisiana (-1.58), 
South Carolina (-1.39), Texas (-1.18) and Alabama (-1.12).  
2.4. Discussion of the Econometric Results 
I did not find evidence of an overall negative impact on growth by resource wealth across 
U.S. states.  Decomposing the overall effect, both crowding-out and institution effects are 
present: the resource boom crowds out industrial investment, but good institutions 
mediate the potential curse. A significant positive direct effect leads the overall resource 
effect to be positive. However, the resource effects vary among states, and an overall 
negative impact appears in states with low-quality institutions. Moreover, different types 
of resources affect growth differently, and oil/gas extraction drives the main results in my 
analysis. 
2.4.1. Baseline analysis 
Table 1-2 reports estimates of the system of equations (1) and (2) with the point resource 
measure. In column I, the system is estimated by Fixed Effect (FE) estimator applied 
equation-by-equation, while columns II shows the results of the 3SLS estimator with 
state and year dummies. In the growth equation, the coefficient on the resource variable is 
insignificant for FE estimator and significantly positive for a 3SLS estimator, implying a 
positive direct resource effect on growth. Meanwhile, the coefficient on the interaction 
between resources and government efficiency is consistently positive and significant, 
suggesting an institution effect. In the equations for investment, human capital, and R&D, 
the resource coefficient is negative and significant in the investment equation and 
positive and significant in the human capital equation. The former supports the crowding-
out effect about industrial investment, while the latter suggests an opposite pattern of 
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human capital development. The results also suggest conditional income convergence, as 
the coefficient on the natural log of lagged per capita income (ln(Inc)t-1) is consistently 
negative and significant in the growth equation.  
The assumption that all regressors are exogenous is unlikely to hold in a system, 
leading to bias. Also, the insignificance of the investment, human capital and R&D 
coefficients in growth equation casts further doubt on the FE results. In the 3SLS 
estimation, investment, human capital, and R&D are endogenous in the system and 
instrumented by included exogenous variables (i.e., state and year dummies, prior income 
level, and institutional quality) and excluded instruments of their two-year lags. The 
diagnostics showed at the bottom of column II support the identification strategy. The 
Anderson LM statistics clearly indicates that the model is not underidentified, and the 
Angrist-Pischke F statistics are well above the rule-of-thumb critical value 10, which 
suggests that the instruments are not weak. With 3SLS, the coefficients on investment, 
human capital, and R&D show the expected sign and are significant at the 5% confidence 
level at least.  
While endogeneity owing to simultaneous relations among variables can be addressed 
by a system of equations model, omitted variables present another possible source of 
bias. In my panel setting, dummy variables control for state and year fixed effects, such 
as geographical characteristics and time-specific macroeconomic shocks. Regarding 
time-variant unobserved variables, I apply the Altonji-Elder-Taber statistic to test for 
bias, as a robustness check (see section 2.5.2). The statistic is greater than one so that it is 
unlikely that unobservables will explain away the result of interest (Altonji et al., 2005; 
Fenske, 2014). 
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Table 1-3 further assesses the direct, crowding-out, and institution effects, and also 
shows the overall resource effect. According to equation (4), it illustrates the linear 
combination of coefficients estimated by 3SLS in Table 2. First, the direct resource effect 
is positive and significant. When the crowding out effects and the institution effects are 
isolated out, theories do not suggest specific direct resource effects (𝛽𝛽2). In a Solow 
growth model, the resources enter the production function as one of the production 
factors among physical capital, human capital and technology, implying a positive or 
neutral direct effect from resources on growth.  
Second, evidence shows a crowding-out effect on investment but not on human capital 
or R&D. Measured as the earning share of industrial machinery productions, industrial 
investments are crowded out by the expanding resource sector in the 2000s. The effect of 
resources on human capital is mixed. A resource boom will draw new employment to the 
mining industry at first, which could lower the human capital stock since the mining 
sector attracts low- or semi-skilled labor more. However, as local demand increases with 
rising incomes rise, living expenses such as house prices or rent rise, as well.  This could 
encourage lower income, less educated labor to move out of the resource-rich region, 
thereby increasing some measures of human capital. Also, resource rents could add to the 
state budget thus increasing education expenditure and educational attainment in a state.  
These offsetting forces might explain why the effect on human capital is neutral in a high 
labor mobility environment such as the U.S.  Regarding R&D, the role of technological 
developments in extracting unconventional oil and gas may explain the insignificant 
crowding-out effect.  
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In addition to supporting crowding-out of investment, the evidence also suggests that 
institution effects can mitigate the resource curse. The Government Efficiency Index 
serves as a measure of ex-ante institutional quality. At the mean level of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
the coefficient estimate shows a positive effect, significant at the 1% confidence level. 
The evidence supports the institution explanation: the resource-growth relation is 
conditional on the institutional quality and resource wealth will not be harmful to growth 
when the institutional quality is strong.  Finally, adding up all three effects, the overall 
resource effect is significant and positive. Sampling counties in the south-central U.S. 
during a similar time period, Weber (2013) also found little evidence of an emerging 
curse from greater natural gas production.  
In summary, I did not find evidence of an overall negative effect on growth by 
resource wealth in my sample. Further decomposing the resource effect, both crowding-
out and institution effects contribute: the resource boom could crowd out industrial 
investment, yet good institutions mediate that effect so that the overall impact of 
resources on growth is neutral. However, resource effects vary among states due to 
variation in the quality of institutions. Moreover, different types of resources can affect 
growth in different ways. I explore these issues at further length in the next section. 
2.4.2. More on the Institution Effects 
Table 1-4 shows the institution effects and overall resource effects in the six most 
resource-rich states. The point resource share is above 10% in all six states, as high as 
29.97% in Wyoming. Five of these states show a negative Government Efficiency Index, 
indicating low government efficiency relative to the national mean. With “bad” ex-ante 
institutions, the institution effect worsens the negative impact of resources. Thus a 
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resource curse emerges in these states. As shown in the last column of Table 1-4, the 
overall resource effect is negative and significant in Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, 
whereas it is positive or neutral in Wyoming, Alaska, and West Virginia.  
This further confirms the logic of the institution mediation mechanism: the resource 
curse is conditional on the institutional quality, and resource wealth becomes a curse in a 
grabber-friendly economy where rent distribution and management are inefficient and 
unproductive. In the literature, the United States is an example of resource-rich countries 
with strong institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2003). The results suggest that government 
actions function well enough on average to avoid a curse. However, government 
efficiency varies across states, and institutions in states at the low end may be bad enough 
that resource wealth in such states becomes harmful to growth. 
I further examine the institution effects with different measures of institutional quality. 
Table 1-5 shows the coefficient estimates for the growth equation using 3SLS with each 
of the institutional quality measures. The coefficients on the resource-institution 
interaction term are consistently significant with the expected sign, except with the 
Economic Freedom Index, where the estimate is insignificant.  These results lend support 
to the institution effect as a mechanism for mitigating the potentially negative impact of 
resource wealth on growth and are consistent with cross-countries evidence by Mehlum 
et al. (2006a, 2006b), Dietz et al. (2007) and Boschini et al. (2013).  
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2.4.3. Different Type of Resources 
Table 1-6 shows the decomposition of the overall resource effect using different 
measures of resources in the 3SLS approach13. The second row, with point resources, is 
the same as the baseline results reported in Table 1-3. The diffuse resource shows no 
crowding-out effects on growth factors and a less significant institution effect, with an 
insignificant overall resource effect. This is consistent with the literature arguing that 
point resources are more likely to be a curse due to their concentrated production and 
revenue patterns.  
The development of point resources has been heterogeneous in the recent decade. The 
U.S. has experienced the large-scale development of unconventional natural gas, which 
has been described as a bonanza (Burnett and Weber, 2014). On the other hand, coal 
production has contracted. Also, the recent oil and gas revolution is motivated by 
technology breakthroughs such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. This 
deviates from the traditional characterization of the resource industry as low in 
innovation and relying intensively on low-skilled workers. These heterogeneities 
motivate me to analyze oil and gas versus other point resources separately14.  
Therefore, I further break down point resources into oil and gas, coal and metal, and 
support activities for mining. The last three rows in Table 6 show the comparison of 
results. The crowding-out effect on investment and institution effects are stronger with oil 
and gas extraction and supporting activities, implying that the oil and gas extraction 
drives the resource-growth relation in my sample. A positive resource effect is shown in 
                                                          
 
13 Full sets of results are provided upon request.  
14 I name extraction earning share other than oil and gas “coal and metal” to facilitate the interpretation.  
30 
 
human capital with oil and gas extraction. Compared with other forms of mining, oil and 
gas extraction, especially the unconventional one, requires a higher proportion of high-
skilled workers (e.g. petroleum engineers). This may explain the different resource 
effects on human capital.  No evidence of crowding-out effects is present with coal and 
metal. The institution effect turns negative and significant with coal and metal, which is 
inconsistent with the narrative of the institution effect. The overall resource effects are 
neutral across different types of resources. 
2.5. Sensitivity Checks 
I conduct three sensitivity checks, including the Added Controls Approach, dynamic and 
spatial models, and re-estimation with alternative dependent variables. The results are 
consistent with the baseline results reported above.  
First, since time-varying unobserved variables are a common source of bias in a fixed 
effect setting, I employ the Added Controls Approach (ACA), originally proposed by 
Altonji et al.  (2005) and formally named by Lopez et al. (2011). This method enhances 
the controls by using a large set of additional time-varying control sets in sequence.  
I am particularly concerned with the unobserved time-varying changes in institutional 
quality that may correlate with resource extraction. Studies have found that governance, 
demographic and social characteristics, and lobbying and other rent-seeking behaviors 
correlate with institutional changes. As I add the Governance, Demographics, and the 
Rent-Seeking Behavior sets of controls 15 in sequence into the fixed effect model on 
equation (3), the within R-square increases relative to the base model, suggesting a rise in 
                                                          
 
15 Detailed definition and data source on all the supplement variables are available in Appendix A 1.3. 
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the explanatory power. Moreover, the coefficients on the point resource and the 
interaction are consistent with my main results16.  
    Second, to further check the sensitivity of results to dynamic and spatial effects, I 
estimate reduced form equation (3) using a static fixed effect estimator with Driscoll and 
Kraay’s standard error (FE)17, a first difference estimator (FD), a dynamic panel 
estimator (Sys-GMM), a spatial autocorrelation model (SAC), and a dynamic spatial 
panel estimator (Dynamic-SAC) . Again, the two coefficients of primary interest —on the 
point resource and the interaction— are consistent with the main results: the institution 
effect is significant and positive while the direct resource effect is neutral or positive18. I 
conclude that my baseline results are fairly robust to the dynamic and spatial effects of 
state growth. 
Third, I replace the dependent variable, annual growth in per capita personal income, 
with growth in real Gross State Production (GSP) per capita, and growth rate in state 
population and re-estimate the system with 3SLS19. The main results are robust to using 
the population growth as the dependent variable, rather than personal income. 
2.6. Conclusion  
The resource curse hypothesis—resource rich economies underperform in economic 
growth— has been tested across countries, especially in developing countries. In this 
study, I tested that hypothesis within the highly developed the United States. A system of 
                                                          
 
16 Results are available in Appendix A 1.4. 
17 One approach to address spatial correlation is Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) nonparametric technique; 
another approach is to directly model the interdependence via spatial panel models. I apply both methods to 
check the sensitivity of the results. 
18 Results are available in Appendix A 1.5. 
19 Results are available in Appendix A 1.6. 
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equations model allows me to decompose the resource effect and account for the two 
mechanisms, crowding-out effects and institution effects, simultaneously in one setting. 
The results suggest that both effects contribute to the resource-growth relation, but also 
that the overall resource effect is positive or neutral.  The results confirm that institutions 
mediate the crowding-out effect and reject the resource curse hypothesis within the U.S. 
in the past two decades. 
This decomposition with the direct, crowding-out, and institution effects at a 
subnational level offers a better understanding of resource curse mechanisms. First, I 
found that the direct resource effect was positive or neutral once the crowding-out and 
institutional effects were isolated. Second, the evidence suggests that resource wealth 
crowds out industrial investment, thus hindering growth in the U.S. This result parallels 
the local Dutch Disease narrative that wealth generated by the sale of natural resources 
tends to crowd out the manufacturing sector. However, I did not find evidence supporting 
the crowding-out of other factors documented in the literature, such as human capital 
stock and R&D expenditure.  
Third, the resource curse is conditional on institutional quality in the U.S., supporting 
the institution mediation effect. I focus on state and local government efficiency as a 
proxy for institutional outcomes and further employ ex-ante measures to minimize 
endogeneity concerns. In their careful cross-country study on the resource curse, 
Boschini et al. (2013) found that an outcome measure, “institutional quality” from the 
International Country Risk Guide, was the one exhibiting strong empirical regularity, 
comparing to other rule-oriented measures. Consistently in my study, the institution 
mediation effect shows explanatory power even within the U.S., where “rules” such as 
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constitutional arrangements, the degree of democracy, or property rights are strong but 
state government efficiencies vary. The result suggests the importance of resource rent 
management in the short-run. A natural extension to this study would be to trace the 
analysis further back as “rules” varied along with time across the U.S., so that both 
aspects of institutions, as well as the long-run crowding-out effects, can be tested.  
Finally, adding up all three effects, the overall effect of resource wealth on growth is 
positive or neutral as a general pattern in the U.S.  However, the resource effects vary 
among states, and the resource “curse” seems to appear in states with low institutional 
qualities, including resource-rich Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. Moreover, different 
types of resources affect growth differently, and oil and gas extraction drives the main 
results in my study. This should draw special policy attention in the context of the shale 
gas boom since the late 1990s.   
In a recent overview of the resource curse literature, Frederick van der Ploeg (2011) 
stated that a key question remained “why some resource-rich economies [.] are more 
successful while others perform badly despite their immense natural wealth”(page 366). 
My study contributes another piece of evidence regarding the U.S.: even though 
relatively strong institutions work to avoid a widespread resource curse, some crowding 
out occurs and may be an issue in states with weaker institutions.  
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2.7. Tables in Chapter 2 
Table 2-1 Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Growth Annual growth in real per capita personal income (%) 1.29 2.32 -11.50 13.38 
Income Annual real per capita personal income (chained 2009 $) 37464.22 5937.57 25022.48 58703.24 
Resource_diffuse Annual percent of earnings in agriculture, forestry, and fishing (%) 1.35 1.51 0.00 8.99 
Resource_point Annual percent of earnings in mining (%) 3.06 6.09 0.00 40.71 
Resource_oil&gasa Annual percent of earnings in oil and gas extraction (%)  1.47 3.92 0.00 38.05 
Resource_coal&metala Annual percent of earnings in extractions other than oil and gas (%) 1.23 2.62 0.00 17.86 
Resource_supporta Annual percent of earnings in support activities for mining (%) 0.44 0.95 0.00 6.98 
Investmenta Annual ratio of industrial machinery production to its GSP (%) 0.97 0.85 0.01 5.55 
Human Capital Annual percentage of state population with a college degree (%) 26.45 4.95 14.60 41.20 
R&D1 Annual ratio of total R&D performed in a state to its GSP (%) 2.12 1.52 0.10 8.76 
Gov. Efficiency b Average Z-score of government services per capita government revenue (state and local government only), 1990-1995 0.08 0.87 -2.25 1.84 
Corruption Average annual public official corruption convictions per 1,000 elected officials3,1987-1997 2.49 3.83 0.09 24.34 
Econ. Freedom Index Average annual Economic Freedom of North America Index (scale from 0 to 10),1981-1995 6.73 0.72 5.06 8.02 
Liability Average annual score of state liability system (scale from 0 to 100), 20024 57.16 8.72 28.40 78.60 
Note: a. The five variables – resource_oil&gas, resource_coal&metal, resource_support, investment, and R&D – cover from 1997 to 2013, with 
850 observations. b. Authors calculated. Please refer to Appendix 3.1 for details. c. The number of state public official corruption convictions is 
from the U.S. Department of Justice. The number of elected officials by the state is reported in 1987, 1992, and 1997 Census of Government. d. 
The earliest data available for Liability is 2002 from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  
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Table 2-2 Testing the Resource Curse in a System of Equations, Point Resources 
  I. FE II. 3SLS 
Investment  Ln(Inc)t-1 0.43 0.31 
  (0.31) (0.26) 
 Resource_point -0.03*** -0.03*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
 Constant -3.66 -2.42 
  (3.21) (2.70) 
 adj. R2 0.92 0.92 
Human Ln(Inc)t-1 0.43 0.46 
Capital  (1.08) (1.13) 
 Resource_point 0.08** 0.10*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) 
 Constant 13.85 14.80 
  (11.12) (11.57) 
 adj. R2 0.95 0.96 
R&D Ln(Inc)t-1 -0.79* -1.06* 
  (0.42) (0.55) 
 Resource_point 0.00 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
 Constant 9.87** 12.58** 
  (4.27) (5.67) 
 adj. R2 0.88 0.89 
Growth Ln(Inc)t-1 -8.61*** -10.78*** 
  (2.29) (2.04) 
 Resource_point 0.12 0.23*** 
  (0.14) (0.08) 
 Resource_point 0.30** 0.41*** 
 ×Gov. Efficiency (0.14) (0.07) 
 Investment 0.37 3.36*** 
  (0.28) (0.75) 
 Human Capital 0.06 0.26* 
  (0.04) (0.15) 
 R&D -0.08 1.52** 
  (0.10) (0.69) 
 Constant 89.30*** 102.7*** 
  (23.49) (21.06) 
 adj. R2 0.57 0.61 
    No.Observations 847 747 
    State Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
    Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
    Anderson LM stat.  18.40*** 
    Angrist-Pischke F-stat. Investment 25.16*** 
 Human Capital 33.17*** 
 R&D  15.14*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; in column (3) 3SLS estimation: 
instrumented: investment, human capital, R&D, included instruments: lagged per capita income level, 
lagged point resource, interaction of lagged point resource and pre-determined government efficient index, 
state fixed effect, and year fixed effect, excluded instruments: lagged investment, human capital, and R&D. 
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Table 2-3 Decomposition of the Marginal Resource Effect on Growth, Point Resources 
Direct Effect Crowding-out Effect Institution Effect Overall Resource Effect Investment Human Capital R&D 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
-0.11** 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.19** 
(0.07) 
Note: according to Equation (4) 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2  + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, calculated based on 
3SLS estimation results of Equation (1) and (2) with point resources; Standard errors in 
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2-4 The Institution Effects and Overall Resource Effects in Six Resource-Rich 
States 
Resource-
rich states 
Point 
Resource 
Share 
Ex Ante Gov. 
Efficiency 
Index 
Institution Effects Overall Resource Effects 
Wyoming 29.97% 0.24 0.10*** (0.02) 0.25*** (0.08) 
Alaska 25.84% -0.02 -0.01***(0.00) 0.15** (0.07) 
West 
Virginia 12.53% -0.47 -0.19***(0.03) -0.03 (0.06) 
Louisiana 11.15% -1.58 -0.64***(0.11) -0.48***(0.10) 
Oklahoma 10.00% -0.86 -0.35***(0.06) -0.19***(0.07) 
Texas 9.75% -1.18 -0.48***(0.08) -0.32***(0.08) 
Note: “Institution Effects” are (𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) and “Overall resource effects” are calculated 
based on the equation (4) 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2  + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, where the coefficient 
estimations are from 3SLS in column (3) table2 and the Government Efficiency Index values are 
listed in the third column. 
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Table 2-5 Institution Reversal Effects with Different Institutional Quality Proxies 
 I.  II. III. IV. 
Growth Gov. 
Efficiency 
Corruption Econ. Freedom  
Index (EFI) 
Liability 
Ln(Inc)t-1 -10.78*** -8.60*** -8.85*** -8.91*** 
 (2.03) (1.98) (1.99) (2.01) 
Resource_point 0.23*** 0.37*** 4.60*** -1.81*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.77) (0.41) 
Resource_point 0.41***    
×Gov.Efficiency (0.07)    
Resource_point  -0.13***   
×Corruption  (0.03)   
Resource_point   -0.64  
×EFI   (0.51)  
Resource_point    0.04*** 
×Liability    (0.01) 
Investment 3.36*** 2.53*** 2.83*** 2.74*** 
 (0.75) (0.71) (0.71) (0.73) 
Human Capital 0.26* 0.27* 0.19 0.30* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
R&D 1.52** 1.60** 1.79*** 1.58** 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.67) (0.70) 
Constant 102.7*** 80.50*** 84.39*** 83.43*** 
 (21.06) (20.76) (21.05) (20.95) 
    No.Observations 747 747 747 747 
    State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: the 3SLS estimation results of Equation (1) and results on equations (2) is omitted; 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2-6 Decomposition of the Overall Resource Effect: Different Type of Resources 
 
Direct 
Effect 
Crowding-out Effect Institution 
Effects 
Overall 
Resource 
Effect Investment 
Human 
Capital R&D 
Diffuse 
Resource 
-0.46 
(0.38) 
0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.033* 
(0.0195) 
-0.18 
(0.25) 
       
Point Resource 0.23*** (0.08) 
-0.11** 
(0.0395) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.19** 
(0.07) 
       
Oil and Gas 0.13 (0.10) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
       
Coal and 
Metal 
0.13 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
- 0.01 
(0.01) 
- 0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.09** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
       
Support 
Activities for 
Mining 
0.37** 
(0.16) 
-0.19** 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.16) 
Note: according to Equation (4) )  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛃𝛃′ ∗ 𝛂𝛂2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, calculated based on 
3SLS estimation results of equations (1) and (2) with different resource types; Standard errors in 
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Chapter 3 The Impacts of Resource Development in China and the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis 
3.1. Introduction 
The effect of resource wealth on economic growth has received considerable attention in 
the economics and political science literature over the last 20 years. Cross-country 
empirical studies tested the resource – growth relation, often referred as the resource 
curse hypothesis, with no consensus conclusions (Auty 1993; Sachs and Warner 1995; 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004; Alexeev and Conrad 2009). Country-level observations 
offer significant variations in resource endowments, and economic growths, which 
facilitate the analysis. However, many confounding features, such as geography, culture, 
and institution quality, also exist and could potentially bias the results, especially in 
cross-sectional analysis. The concern persists with panel-data given the time-varying 
hard-to-measure factors like macroeconomic policies.  
    To alleviate these issues, within-country evidence have also emerged, sampling in 
China (Fan, Fang and Park, 2012; Ji, Magnus and Wang, 2014; Shao and Qi, 2009), the 
U.S. (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2007; Weber 2013), Canada (Papyrakis and Raveh 2014), 
Russia (Alexeev and Chernyavskiy 2015) and Peru (Aragón, Rud and Arag, 2013) among 
other nations. Regional level analyses reduce the danger of spurious correlations by 
analyzing subnational regions facing the same economic system, institution arrangement, 
macroeconomic policies, and less various cultures and institutional qualities. The tradeoff 
is to forgo opportunities of testing impacts from persistent features, such as the economic 
system and institution arrangement. For economies in transition, weak price signal and 
prevailing state ownership likely lead to inefficient resource allocation, leaving a weak or 
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even negative resource-growth relation. The main goal of this paper is to illustrate this 
argument using comparative regional-level analysis of the resource wealth impacts in 
China and the United States.  
    Among other nations, several unique characteristics endow China and the U.S. suitable 
for the resource-growth relation comparison. First, China and the U.S. were the top two 
countries in primary energy production in 2015. The resource endowment varies 
significantly across Chinese provinces and American states. Second, with similar size of 
gross economies, China and the U.S. contrast with each other in economic systems and 
institution arrangements. The comparison could shed light on impacts of market and 
fiscal reforms in China since the 1990s. Third, both countries have experienced booming 
in resource extractions in the 2000s yet with different resources. Being able to decompose 
resources into crude oil, natural gas, and coal helps to further identify the booming effect 
from the country effect.   
    In this study, I use comparable measures to examine the effects of resource revenues 
on the economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and 
American states from 1990 to 2015. With the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy 
implemented in the panel datasets, I show that regions with higher resource revenues 
grow faster than other regions in both China and the U.S.  The positive resource effect is 
larger in the U.S.  Further testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g. 
the market price reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show 
that the market price reform together with the privatization process on coal resources 
contribute the positive resource effect in China. Though strong and positive resource – 
growth relations appear in both countries, evidence also suggests consistent negative 
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resource effects on certain growth-related factors in both countries, such as educational 
attainments and R&D activities.  
    The resource – growth relation has been studied in both China and the U.S. at the 
regional level. A few empirical studies within China concluded mixed results. Using a 
panel dataset from 1985 to 2005 at the provincial level and pooled regression model, 
Zhang, Xing, Fan, and Luo (2008) associated a slower growth rate of per capita 
consumption with rich resources, especially in the rural region. Shao and Qi (2009) 
confirmed resource curse hypothesis in China, and the crowding-out effect is mainly 
towards human capital input. Moreover, Shao and Qi (2009) sampled ten provinces from 
western China, which may lead to selection bias because they are all from inland China 
with lower initial development comparing to the East. On the other hand, Fan, Fang and 
Park (2012b) found no supportive evidence to the “resource curse” phenomenon in city 
level of China over the period 1997-2005 for the 95 cities with a functional coefficient 
model. Ji, Magnus and Wang (2014) applied two different resource abundance measures- 
the resource reserve stock measure and the resource revenue flow measure – and found a 
positive resource effect on economic growth at the provincial level in China between 
1990 and 2008. Overall, the mixed results can be attributed to different samples, 
measures and methods that have been applied, and also some drawbacks on 
measurements and models.  
    This study contributes to the literature with the first comparison piece between Chinese 
provinces and the U.S. states on testing the resource-growth relation. Closest to this 
study, Alexeev and Chernyavskiy (2014) examine the effect of oil on the growth of 
Russia’s regions and American states. I improve the analysis by employing an 
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Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy to address the omitted variable bias and potential 
reverse causality. To the best of my knowledge, this is also the first study in the China 
literature to link and empirically test impacts of market price reforms and the fiscal 
reform in the resource-growth relation.     
3.2. Resource Development in China and the U.S.  
3.2.1. Resource Production and Reserves  
Both China and the U.S. have developed from rich land with large resource endowments. 
According to the Global Energy Statistical Yearbook (2016), China and the U.S. lead the 
world in primary energy productions20 in 2015 at 2,640 and 2,012 million metric tons of 
oil equivalents (Mtoe) respectively, followed by Russian at 1,341 Mtoe. China surpassed 
the U.S. and became the world largest energy producer in 2005. Figure 2-1 and 2-2 
compare the total primary energy production by resource types in China and the U.S. 
since 1990.  
    Despite large total energy productions, the two countries show different energy 
compositions21. Coal dominates the primary energy production in China. China has been 
the world’s leading coal producer and consumer since the early 1980s. In 1990, 77.8 
percent of the total primary energy production was from coal, while crude oil, natural 
gas, and other renewable energy made up 19.9, 2 and 0.3 percent respectively. Until 
2014, coal remains the main energy source in China, accounting for 76.5 percent of the 
                                                          
 
20 Primary energy is an energy form found in nature that has not been subjected to any conversion or 
transformation process. 
21 To enable the comparison across resources, I convert different energy units for crude oil (barrels), natural 
gas (cubic feet) and coal (metric tons) into the heat unit – British thermal unit (Btu) based on heat content 
of fuels. 
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total primary energy production. Crude oil has dropped to 8.3 percent while natural gas 
and other energy have increased to 4.3% and 10.8% of total primary energy production. 
In the U.S., the energy composition has been balanced and stable. Natural gas has 
surpassed coal and taken the largest share of primary energy production at 33 percent 
since 2011. In 2014, natural gas, coal, crude oil, and other renewable energy was 33.5, 
25.4, 22.6 and 18.4 percent of the total primary energy production respectively.  
    Energy productions have been increasing in both China and the U.S. during the study 
period, with distinct booming resources. In 2015, coal production more than quadrupled 
in China at 3.68 billion metric tons, comparing to the production in 2000 at 0.88 billion 
metric tons. The surge in coal production took place between 2000 and 2009 with more 
than 10 percent growth rate annually.  25 out of 31 provinces or province equivalent 
municipalities produced coal. The top three coal-producing provinces, Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia, and Shaanxi, all located in northern and central China, supplied 64 percent of 
the total coal production. During the same period, coal production stagnated at around 0.8 
to 1 billion metric tons in the U.S. (Figure 2-2 panel C). Wyoming alone accounted for 
41.9 percent of total U.S. coal production in 2015. Four states in the Appalachian region, 
West Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, together produced another 20 
percent. Owing to the shale oil and gas development, production of natural gas and crude 
oil has boomed in the U.S. after 2005. In 2013, the U.S. surpassed Russia and became the 
world largest gas producer. In 2015, the top five natural gas-producing states are Texas 
(27.4%), Pennsylvania (16.7%), Oklahoma (8.7%), Wyoming (6.2%), and Louisiana 
(6.2%), which accounted for approximately 65 percent of the total natural gas production 
in the U.S.  Similarly, about 65 percent of U.S. crude oil production came from five states 
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in 2015: Texas (37%), North Dakota (12%), California (6%), Alaska (5%), and 
Oklahoma (5%).  
    Different production pattern reveals different reserve mix in the two countries. Figure 
2-3 compares proved reserves of the crude oil, natural gas, and coal in China and the U.S. 
in 1990. While both countries held similar crude oil, the U.S. was rich in natural gas and 
China was with much larger coal endowment.  In China, coal fields concentrate in north 
central regions where the top three coal-producing provinces, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
and Shaanxi, are adjacent. China’s largest oil fields are located in the northeast region 
(Daqing field), the northwest’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (including the 
Junggar and Tarim basins), and north central region in Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and 
Gansu provinces (Ordos Basin) (Gordon, Sautin and Tao 201422). The primary natural 
gas-producing regions in China are Sichuan province in the southwest (Sichuan Basin), 
the Xinjiang and Qinghai provinces in the northwest (Tarim, Junggar and Qaidam 
Basins), and Gansu province in the north center (Ordos Basin).  
    In summary, China and the U.S. are the top two energy producing countries in the 
world. Yet, the resource composition and extractions contrast between the two, where 
coal has been the dominant energy resource in China and natural gas has recently become 
the main energy in the U.S.  In either China or the U.S., resource endowments tend to 
concentrate in certain regions but also show regional sparsity across oil, natural gas, and 
coal. These variations offer opportunities to identify resource type effects from the 
                                                          
 
22 Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Deborah Gordon, Yevgen Sautin, and Wang Tao), 
"China's Oil Future", May 6, 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/06/china-s-oil-future-pub-55437 
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country effect, which is driven by two distinct institution settings between China and the 
U.S.   
3.2.2. Resource-related Policies in China  
The distinctive economic systems in China and the U.S. could make a difference in 
resource-growth relations. As the world’s largest national economy in nominal terms, the 
U.S. is a mixed economy and more towards a free market economy. Run by a single 
party, the Communist Party of China (CPC), China is an economy in transition from 
planning to market-orienting.  Since the economic reform in December 1978, China has 
been the world’s fastest-growing major developing economy. Given the strategic role in 
the economy and national security, resource sectors, especially energy sectors, fall behind 
in the market reform and are still heavily managed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). I 
discuss three resource-related policy shifts in China since 1990 (Table 2-1).  
3.2.2.1. Market Price Reforms 
Before 1978, China adopted a state pricing system in which the state set prices of goods, 
including energy prices, regardless market forces. In 1984, a dual pricing system was 
implemented. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) could sell up to a predetermined quota of 
goods at state-set prices and then sell above the quota at higher prices. Facing energy 
shortages and weak incentive in energy conservation investment, China began to reform 
its energy prices in 1993 and pushed it forward with different paces and scales across 
energy types (Zhang 2014).  
    Coal was ahead of oil and natural gas in the price reform. In 1993, coal prices were 
formed in a two-track system: the price of non-utility-use coal was determined by the 
market, whereas the price of utility-use coal, the so-called power coal, was based on 
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“guidance price” set by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)23. 
NDRC abolished its guidance price for power coal in 2003 and set price bands for 
negotiations between coal producers and electricity generators, which was further 
abolished in December 2012. As shown in Figure 2-4 panel C, the state-set coal price was 
under market prices, e.g. the world coal price or the U.S. coal price before 1993. Since 
1993, the average coal price in China has tracked the world coal price well with less 
fluctuation, due to the guidance price then later price bands for the power coal till 2012.  
Between 1994 and 1997, the crude oil price was set at irregular intervals by the State 
Planning Commission (SPC). Since 1998, domestic crude oil prices have tracked 
international prices but not the case for refined oil product price. Until May 2009, refined 
oil prices would be adjusted if the moving average of international crude oil prices 
changes more than 4 percent within 22 consecutive working days, which was shortened 
to 10 working days in March 2013. Comparing to the world and U.S. oil prices, the crude 
oil price in China moved from lower prices before 1993 to higher prices and had tracked 
the world price fluctuations closely since 1998 (Figure 2-4 panel A).  
    Natural gas prices are still set by the state throughout the supply chain today. Since 
1978, the state has adjusted the wellhead price of natural gas five times in 1982, 1994, 
2002, 2007, and 2010 (Shi et al. 2012). The most recent price adjustment in June 2010 
has increased domestic producer price of natural gas by 25 percent (Figure 2-4 panel B). 
                                                          
 
23 In 2012, about half of the coal in China was used for power generation. The industrial sector, including 
steel, iron, cement, and coke, accounted for 41 percent usage, and the remaining share was consumed by 
the residential, service, and other sectors (National Bureau of Statistics, China, 2014). 
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With the shale development in the U.S., both world and U.S. natural gas prices have 
dropped since 2005.  
    Prices reveal values of natural resources and translate resource endowments into 
resource revenue or wealth in an economy. Market prices effectively signal the resource 
scarcity and market forces, thus lead to an efficient resource allocation. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that the market price reform on resource sectors in China will stimulate 
resource revenue to contribute the regional growth more or meditate a potential resource 
curse relation.  
3.2.2.2. Resource Ownerships and the Fiscal Reform   
That how the resource rent flow matters in the resource-growth relation. Point resources 
(e.g., minerals and fossil fuels) generate concentrated production and revenue patterns, 
which are more likely to be controlled by relatively small groups of society, exhibiting 
so-called “executive discretion in revenue allocation” (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). In 
the U.S., both private and public sectors can capture the resource rent or wealth, 
depending on ownerships of land or resources (Weber, Burnett and Xiarchos, 2016; 
Weber, Wang and Chomas, 2016). Total resource rents are channeled to land owners, 
resource extraction companies, and governments through royalties, profit, and taxes 
respectively. Resource endowment could fuel regional economic growth if localities 
retain a certain share of resource rent and direct them to promote local development. For 
example, Weber, Burnett and Xiarchos (2016) show that the oil and gas tax base in Texas 
is capitalized into housing values and increases in school revenues through local property 
taxes on oil and gas wells.  
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    The resource rent flow looks differently in China because the state owns all lands and 
natural resources. Three major national oil companies – China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) – dominate the oil and natural gas 
upstream and downstream sectors. CNPC is the upstream leader and accounts for an 
estimated 54 percent and 77 percent of China’s crude oil and natural gas output, 
respectively, according to FACTS Global Energy (FGE)24. With relatively lower capital 
input, coal mining in China has traditionally been fragmented among large state-owned 
coal mines, local state-owned coal mines, and thousands of small-scale town and village 
coal mines. In turn, they account for about 50, 20, and 30 percent of the total coal output 
(Andrews-Speed et al. 2000). Nonetheless, the state would capture all the resource rent 
since it owns both natural resources and companies. Assume that revenues of provincial 
or local government influence regional economic growth more directly than central 
government revenues, the question becomes how central and provincial governments 
split resource revenues. 
    In the distribution of resource rents, the province and local governments have gained 
more rights from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In 1994, China adopted a tax-
sharing system between central and provincial government: taxes that are broad and 
concentrated, such as the consumption tax and tariffs, are assigned to the central 
government; those are narrow and scatter are provincial and local taxes; and other taxes 
are split between the central and provincial governments. Onshore resource taxes are 
                                                          
 
24 FGE, China Oil & Gas Monthly: Data Tables, March 2015 (EIA estimates), pages 1 and 8. 
 
50 
 
assigned to provincial and local governments while the central government is collecting 
revenues from resource taxes offshore. In 2011, China installed an ad valorem resource 
tax of 5% on oil and natural gas, instead of taxes levied on extracted volume since 1985. 
Besides resource taxes, more than 30 taxes and fees are levied on the mining industry. 
Value-added tax, income tax, and resource tax account for about 80 percent of the tax 
revenue from mining industry (see Table 2-2). Overall, the central government captured 
51.55 percent tax revenues from resources, leaving the rest with provincial governments 
and their localities. However, the tax-sharing system increased the share of the central 
government in the total government revenue to 55.7 percent in 1994 from 22 percent in 
the previous year (Zhang 2014). Nonetheless, under the new regulations since 1994, 
province governments were permitted to explore and develop mineral resources and 
allowed to auction the development rights of mineral resources to the private sector, 
including multinational companies, though SOEs still enjoyed preferential treatment in 
developing large mineral reserves. Province and local governments have a strong 
incentive to sell exploration and mining rights since it is a quick way to create revenues. 
As a result, many small-scale mines have been privatized since 1994. 
    In summary, I recognize the year 1994 and 2011 as key policy changing years with the 
fiscal reform and the adjustment of the resource tax rate in China. On the one hand, the 
tax-sharing system increased revenues for the central government and reduced provincial 
government tax revenues. It could weaken the link between resource endowments and the 
regional growth. On the other hand, the privatization process on small-scale mines since 
1994 could help to retain the resource wealth at the local level. Therefore, the effect of 
the 1994 policy on the resource-growth relation leaves as an empirical question.  
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3.2.2.3. Regional Development Strategies   
 
To narrow the development gap among regions, the Chinese government has 
implemented three large-scale development strategies since the 2000s (Figure 2-5). One 
of them, namely the Western Development Strategy, is energy focused.  Moreover, the 
other two, the Revitalize Northeast China Strategy, and the Rise of Central China 
Strategy, show certain resource related elements.  
    The Western China Development Strategy was carried out in January 2000, covering 
six provinces, five autonomous regions, and one municipality. In 2000, this region 
produced 69.8 percent natural gas, 19.1 percent crude oil, and 27.19 percent coal of the 
national output respectively. Part of this significant policy package is to promote natural 
resource exploitation in this region with the help of infrastructure projects such as West-
East Gas Pipeline, West-East Electric Transmission Line, and Qinghai-Tibet Railway. 
With most of the infrastructure projects completed by 2010, energy productions increased 
significantly comparing to those at the beginning of the Western China Development. In 
2015, the western region contributed 80.1 percent natural gas, 32.4 percent crude oil, and 
54.7 percent coal to the total primary energy output.  
    Northeast China consists of 3 provinces and the eastern part of the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Regions. The Daqing oil field, located in this region, is one of the oldest and 
most prolific fields in China, constituting 19 percent of the total crude oil production. 
Owing to the abundant resource endowment and geopolitical relations with the pre-Soviet 
Union, northeast China was built as the first and largest industrialized region in the 1950s 
to 1960s (Zhang 2008). It felt behind in development since 1978 when the reform and 
opening up policy focused on coastal areas and northeast region supplied raw and 
 
52 
 
processed materials with low state-set prices to the southeast coastal area. The Revitalize 
Northeast China Strategy since 2004 targeted structure adjustment and transform the 
large and medium-sized State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) into the modern corporate 
system, including oil, chemical, and automobile industries. The three provinces closed 
122 bankrupt SOEs in 2004 and 2005 (Zhang 2008). The share of primary energy 
production from this region has been declining – the region produced 52.69 percent crude 
oil, 28.66 percent natural gas, and 14.83 percent coal in 1990; however, in 2015, these 
shares dropped to 25.80 percent crude oil, 4.55 percent natural gas, and 3.69 percent coal.  
    The six provinces in the Rise of Central China strategy targeted agricultural 
industrialization except for Shanxi province.  Due to the declining economic 
performance, Shanxi was nominated as the first national reform pilot area focusing on the 
resource sector transformation in 2010. In 2015, Shanxi is still the largest coal producing 
province, accounted for 25.6 percent of total coal output in China.  
    In central China, the traditional coal province, Shanxi, is under reform pilot to deal 
with the poor economic performance. In western China, the resource-rich region is 
encouraged to extract more to stimulate regional growth. Studies that investigated the 
role of the Western Development Strategy in the resource–growth relation have drawn 
various conclusions: Shao and Qi (2009) suggested the 2000 policy change induced a 
resource curse in the western region while Ji, Magnus and Wang (2014) found a positive 
correlation between economic growth and resource revenues after the 2000 policy shock, 
though the effect declines in the long run. I test policy impacts in China, aiming to 
explain differences or similarities of resource-growth relations between Chinese 
provinces and the U.S. states. 
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3.3. Empirical Analysis 
Two main goals are in the empirical analysis: 1) to investigate and compare resource 
effects in China and the U.S. on regional economic growth and other growth-related 
factors, including investment, education attainment in the population, R&D activities, and 
corruptions; 2) to test policy interventions in altering the resource – growth relation in 
China.  
3.3.1. Model Specification and Identification 
A panel model is specified in equation (1) to test resource effects at province or state 
level in China and the U.S. respectively: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                         (1) 
    Subscripts i and t index province (state) and time, respectively. Y represents outcome 
variables. In the resource – growth relation, Y is the growth in real per capita GDP. In 
testing resource effects on growth-related factors, Y is investment share, college 
population share, R&D expenditure share, patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per 
million persons respectively (Table 2-2). GDPpc is provincial or state GDP per capita 
with one period lag that controls for the initial GDP level.   R is resource revenue per 
capita. I measure four resource revenues by resource types: crude oil, natural gas, and 
coal revenue per capita and total resource revenue per capita. The first three revenues are 
obtained by multiplying annual production with provincial or regional prices for each 
resource. Then sum all revenues from the three resources to obtain total resource revenue. 
All resource revenues are deflated into 2009 real currency and divided by the population 
to get the revenue per capita by province (or state) by year. Province or state level prices 
are used whenever possible to obtain province or state specific revenue on a certain 
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resource. Regional prices are employed when the province or state-specific price data are 
not available. 𝛽𝛽2 indicates the resource effect in testing.  X is a matrix of growth-related 
variables including investment share, college population share, R&D expenditure share, 
patents per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons. They are omitted if the 
growth- related variable become the outcome variable to be tested. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is a province/state-
specific fixed effect for each province/state i, which accounts for confounding factors that 
are common to the same province or state over time.  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is the dummy variable for year, 
which allows for nationwide shocks and growth trends over time not otherwise accounted 
for by the explanatory variables. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents all remaining unobserved determinants of 
outcomes.  
    Two issues warrant discussion on the model specification: reverse causality and 
omitted variables.  The regional economic growth or development level could alter 
resource production decisions thus draw concerns of reverse causality. In China, regional 
development strategies aim to promote economic development through favorable policy 
packages including industrial policies. In the case of the West Development Strategy, 
economic developments in the 12 western provinces or province equivalent regions were 
lagged behind, and energy sectors were picked to promote aiming to stimulate the 
regional growth, which could bias the result downward.  
    Omitted variable will bias coefficients if a third factor affects both resource revenues 
in the region and the outcome variable, e.g. regional growth or other regional growth-
related factors. The province or state fixed effects sweep out time-invariant features of a 
province or state. The year dummies control for national shocks or other omitted factors 
that change over time across the country.  Unobserved time-variant regional 
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characteristics could bias the result. A province or state can influence whether or not 
extraction occurs in their area.  With a fiscal decentralization process in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s in China, province and local governments have strong incentives to sell 
mining rights to generate revenues. In the U.S., the states of New York and Vermont 
have placed moratoria on unconventional energy extraction, due to the potential local 
externalities related to the practice, such as air, water, and noise pollution, amongst other 
things. Whether a regional economy is “producer friendly” or “grabber friendly” in 
allocating entrepreneurial activities is changing over time and a challenge to observe.   
    To address the potential reverse causality and omitted variable bias, I require an 
instrument for resource revenue measures, R, in equation (1). I rely on the geographic 
variations in resource reserves in the initial year 1990 and multiply them with the national 
primary resource prices. Oil, gas, coal and total resource revenue measures are 
instrumented with corresponding reserves and prices. The Two-Stage Least Square 
(2SLS) estimator is specified in equation (2) and (3).  
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                             (2) 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,1990 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛿𝛿 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(3) 
    Two conditions are required for the instrumental variable strategy to be valid. First, 
resource reserves and national resource price must have a significant effect on regional 
resource revenues. This condition holds intuitively and can be tested statistically with the 
first-stage F test. Second, the instrument should be exogenous to the error term in 
equation (1). The spatial variation in initial resource reserves or endowments comes from 
the geological characteristic and the exploration technology at the time. The former is 
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exogenous natural factors, and the latter might reflect general initial economic factors but 
exogenous to the provincial or state economic conditions. With state and year fixed 
effects control for the general shocks and trends, national resource prices are plausibly 
exogenous to regional time-variant unobservables. Similar strategies have been 
successfully implemented by Papyrakis and Raveh (2014), Allcott and Keniston (2014) 
and Cascio and Narayan (2015).  
3.3.2. Data and Summary Statistics 
I construct two panel datasets of Chinese provinces and U.S. states from 1990 to 2015. 
For consistent comparison, variables are defined as closely as possible given data 
availabilities (see Table 3). The China dataset covers 30 provincial level regions of 
mainland China. Mainland China consists of 22 provinces, five minority autonomous 
regions, four municipalities and two special autonomous regions. One minority 
autonomous region (Tibet) and two special autonomous regions (Hong Kong and Macao) 
were omitted due to the missing data issue. In 1996, Chongqing was separated from 
Sichuan Province as the fourth municipality after Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. I 
combined Chongqing and Sichuan data after 1996 to keep consistency. The data were 
from China National Bureau of Statistics and China Economic Information Network. The 
U.S. dataset covers the 50 U.S. states. Resource related data are from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). Other data sources include the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Science Foundations, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. 
Department of Justice and Yamarik (2013). There are 750 observations in China dataset 
and 1,300 observations in the U.S. dataset.  
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    Table 2-4 shows the summary statistics and comparison of Chinese provinces and U.S. 
states. Owing to a much larger population, the total resource revenue per capita in 
Chinese provinces is ¥1,417 (about $207.5), comparing to $1,630.5 in U.S. states on 
average. All three types of resource revenues per capita – crude oil, natural gas, and coal 
– are much lower in Chinese provinces than those in U.S. states. In Chinese provinces, 
revenues from crude oil and coal account for 95 percent of the total resource revenue, 
whereas in the U.S. states, crude oil and natural gas revenues take up 80 percent of their 
total resource revenue. In 1990, average oil and coal reserves in 1990 were larger in 
Chinese provinces, while the gas reserve is larger in the U.S. states. On average, the 
crude oil first purchase price is ¥465.74 per barrel (about $67.20) in China, which is 50 
percent higher than $45.39 per barrel in the U.S.  The natural gas wellhead price in China 
is 11 percent lower than the $4.04 per thousand cubic feet in the U.S. China average coal 
price is ¥383.60 per metric ton (about $56.16), comparing to $30.91 per metric ton in the 
U.S. 
    Turn to growth-related variables. Chinese provinces reached 9.64 percent annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita on average, with the average GDP per capita at ¥ 19,015 
(about $ 2,784). The average GDP per capita among U.S. states is $ 42,545 with a 2.61 
percent average annual growth rate.  On average, Chinese provinces hold much lower 
statistics in investment share, college population share, R&D expenditure share and 
higher number in duty crimes per million persons. The patent numbers are comparable 
between two countries. In summary, Chinese provinces are developing economies in 
transition with lower resource revenue per capita and higher total resource reserves, 
comparing to the U.S. states.   
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3.4. Discussion on Comparison Result 
Evidence suggests that resource revenues increase the regional growth in both China and 
the U.S. with a larger and more statistically significant effect shown across U.S. states. 
The booming resources, coal in China, oil and natural gas in the U.S., contribute to the 
positive resource – growth relation in the short term. Resource revenues show negative 
effects on education attainments and R&D activities while pushing up the investment in 
the region.   
3.4.1. Resource Effects on Regional Growth 
The results from testing the resource and regional growth relation across Chinese 
provinces and the U.S. states are summarized in Table 2-5. In turn, I regress four resource 
revenue measures – total resource revenue per capita, crude oil revenue per capita, 
natural gas revenue per capita, and coal revenue per capita – on the annual growth rate of 
GDP per capital. Results from both Fixed Effects (FE) and Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimators are reported, where the IV estimator instrument resource revenue measures 
with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for 
resources respectively. All models in Table 5 include province/state and year fixed 
effects, and controls, such as investment share, college share, R&D expenditure share, 
patents per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons. The Kleibergen-Paap F-
statistics for the first stage in IV models is well above a rule of thumb of 10 for one 
endogenous regressor and one instrument suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), as well 
as the 16.38 level suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005).  
    Both countries show evidence that regional GDP per capita growth is increasing in the 
resource revenue but are driven by different resources. In China on average, an increase 
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of ¥ 1,000 resource revenue per capita will lead to a 0.505 percent higher annual growth 
rate of provincial GDP per capita, all else equal (column (2) in panel A Table 2-5). Given 
the average resource revenue per capita at ¥ 1,417 and average growth rate of 9.64 
percent, the estimated magnitude is small. Regarding elasticity, a one percent increase in 
the total resource revenue per capita will result in a 0.07 percent increase in the growth 
rate on average. In the U.S., the coefficient of the resource revenue suggests the elasticity 
at 0.0044: a one percent increase in the total resource revenue per capita leads to a 0.44 
percent increase in state growth rate on average. Increasing resource revenues promote 
regional economic growth better in the U.S. than in China. Decompose the total resource 
revenue into oil, natural gas, and coal revenues per capita. Only coal revenue shows the 
positive and significant effect on growth in China. While in the U.S., the influence comes 
from oil and natural gas.  
    What could make the difference? With energy sectors in China experiencing the 
market reform since the 1990s, the less elastic resource effect on growth in China seems 
to suggest inefficient extractions of resources due to price control and the state 
ownership. Among the three resources, coal market was the first one to take on the 
market price reform. The pricing of coal has been liberalized to a great extent in the early 
1990s, and “by 1998 coal was, to all intents and purposes, traded on a free market” 
(Andrews-Speed 2012, pp168).  The privatized, then township and village mines 
contribute around 40 percent of total coal production in China. In the case of oil and 
natural gas, the crude oil price was linked to international prices through a formula set by 
the state in 1998, and natural gas prices continued to be set by the government throughout 
the supply chain (Andrews-Speed, 2004).  It seems that the impact of a deeper market 
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reform on coal has shown in the positive resource effect on regional growth in China. I 
will further investigate the policy impacts in section 3.5.  Also, the coal production 
boomed during 2001 and 2009 with more than 10 percent annual growth (Figure 2-2 
panel C). At the similar period, natural gas and oil had received growing higher revenues 
in the U.S. owing to the booming unconventional extraction and surging oil and gas 
prices in the 2000s. The booming resources seem to stimulate the regional growth.  
The resource effect on annual growth rate and long-run growth could be different. The 
annual growth captures how the economy responds to fluctuations in resource sectors. 
Growth effects from the boom and bust cycle in resource revenues could be asymmetric 
and beyond annual impacts. Long-run cross-sectional specifications in literature bear 
concerns on omitted variable bias (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; James and Aadland, 
2011).  I reshape the datasets into 5-year panels to test the resource effect on growth in a 
longer term. Table 6 shows the results. The dependent variable is the average annual 
growth of every five years, constructed as  
1
𝑇𝑇
ln(𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
). The independent variables are 
measures of initial years in each panel. The initial resource revenues show positive 
effects on 5-year regional growth in both countries, with an increased marginal effect in 
China comparing to the annual growth analysis. While coal still drives the result in 
China, oil and natural gas revenues lose their contribution to coal in the U.S.  With price 
drops in natural gas, the natural gas revenue per capital kept declining since 2008 despite 
the increasing production. The insignificant result on natural gas in the U.S. could reflect 
that resource effects during boom and bust periods were canceled out, leaving no growth 
effect on average.  
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3.4.2. Resource Effects on Growth-related Factors 
Resource revenues can affect regional growth through its influence on growth-related 
factors. On the one hand, resource development might push up the fixed assets 
investment in a region given that resource sectors are capital intensive. On the other hand, 
anticipating a stream of returns from the natural resource, an agent has less desire to 
invest in man-made capital for future periods (Gylfason and Zoega, 2006), such as human 
capital (Gylfason, 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; Weber, 2013) and R&D activities 
(Sachs and Warner, 2001). Moreover, resource developments could erode the institution 
quality in resource-rich regions because the concentrated production and revenue pattern 
related to resource windfalls tend to breed rent-seeking behaviors and harm political 
institutions (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Murshed, 2004).  
    I test and compare resource effects on regional investment, education attainment, R&D 
activities, and duty crimes among government officers25. Replaced the outcome variable 
in equation (2) with the investment share, college population share, R&D expenditure 
share, patents per thousand people and duty crimes per million people individually, both 
Fixed Effects (FE) and Instrumental Variable (IV) estimators are employed. Table 2-7 
shows the results of the total resource revenue effect on the five growth-related factors. In 
China, an increase in total resource revenue per capita increases the share of total fixed 
asset investment over provincial GDP (the investment share), but decreases the percent of 
the total population with a college or higher degree (college share), public R&D 
                                                          
 
25 Duty crimes are crimes that committed by working personnel in government or state-owned companies, 
enterprises, institutions, and organizations, such as corruption, bribery, engaging in malpractices for 
personal gain, abuse their powers, and neglect their duties. 
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expenditure share, and the number of patents granted per thousand people. The results for 
the U.S. are consistent except no significant effect on college population share but 
evidence of corruptions per million people increasing in the resource revenue per capita.  
    Further decompose the resource revenue and the results show patterns as well as 
differences across resource types and countries (Table 2-8). With the resource ownership 
concentrated in the government (in the case of China) or large energy companies (in the 
case of the U.S.), one may speculate that resource rents were channeled away to either 
governments or corporation headquarters far from production sites. However, the results 
suggest otherwise. Revenues from all resources in both China and the U.S. increase the 
investment share in the region, with one exception oil revenue in China (column (1) in 
Table 2-8). It implies that resource-rich regions have attracted more investment on fixed 
assets in Chinese provinces and more gross private investment in U.S. states. Consistent 
negative effects are shown in R&D activities. Across resources and countries, resource 
revenues are crowding out R&D expenditure share as well as patents granted (column (3) 
and (4) in Table 2-8). Moreover, negative resource effects are larger in China.  
    Different resource effects are shown on college population share and duty crimes 
between two countries. In China, the coal revenue lowers percent of the total population 
with a college or higher degree across provinces while it is the natural gas revenue in the 
U.S. depresses the educational attainments in states. In a subnational context, two factors 
would result in a declining educated population in a region: low educational attainment of 
residents and skill-biased migration across regions. While literature shows evidence that 
the booming resource extraction reduces high school enrollment (Black et al. 2005; 
Cascio and Narayan, 2015), implying resource developments disrupt the formation of 
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human capital. I focused on the education attainment measure – percent of the total 
population with a college or higher degree – to reveal the outcome of regional human 
capital stock considering the skill-biased migration within a nation. In other words, 
human capital formation might be crucial in long-run growth for a nation, but given the 
mobility across regions within a nation, it is the human capital stock contained in a region 
matters in regional growth at the time.  Technically, resource extraction requires low-
educated physical labor and coal production require more labor than oil or natural gas 
production. In the U.S., coal revenues did not show significant impact on college 
population share. The results suggest resources with booming production tend to decrease 
the education attainment in a region, such as surged production of coal in China and the 
shale gas boom in the U.S. Finally, only oil revenues seem to be related to rent seeking 
behaviors, such as duty crimes and corruptions, though the sign of the coefficient in 
China is not intuitive.  
3.5. The China Case 
I shift my focus on the China case in this section. I test impacts of three resource-related 
policies, the Market Price Reform, the Fiscal Reform, and the Western Development 
Strategy, on altering the resource – growth relation across regions. 
3.5.1. Market Price Reforms 
Market price reforms on coal, crude oil, and natural gas sectors have been rolled out one 
after another since 1993 (see Table 2-1 and detailed discussion in 2.2). I explore 
variations in policy timings across the three resources and identify the year 1993 and 
2003 for coal, and year 1998 for crude oil as potential milestones in shifting the resource 
– growth relation. Interactions of resource revenue measures and corresponding policy 
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years are then introduced into the instrumental variable (IV) specification shown in 
equation (2) and (3). The same specifications with interactions are also employed to 
natural gas, which serves as placebo tests. 
    Table 2-9 summarized the results on testing market price reform impacts. The market 
price reform in coal shows significant evidence in stimulating regional growth (column 
(1) and (2) in Table 2-9). With a state-set price before 1993, a negative resource effect 
shows on the regional growth: an increase of ¥1,000 coal revenue per capita decreases 
provincial growth by 0.01 percent. Once the two-track system freed the price of non-
utility coals, the marginal effect of the coal revenue on growth becomes positive with 
much larger magnitude. As the price reform moved forward and the price of power coals 
linked to the market since 2003, the positive effect of the coal revenue on provincial 
growth became even larger. Evidence implies the market price reform in coal has 
significantly helped to promote a positive resource – growth relation.  
    On the other hand, the impact of the market price reform on crude oil has not been 
significant (column (3) and (4) in Table 2-9). Though the crude oil price has linked to the 
international price since 1998, it is still adjusted by the state periodically lagging the 
international price. More importantly, the international price reveals market forces in a 
world market but omits or underrepresents the demand and supply signal in the domestic 
Chinese market. Without market prices negotiated domestically but simply adopting the 
international price, resource allocations across regions would be still inferior to the 
efficient level.  As for the natural gas price, where the state continued to set throughout 
the supply chain, no effects are shown with any price policy milestones as expected. 
Overall, market price reforms in energy sectors have been shown to be successful for 
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coal, need to be deepened in crude oil sectors, and call for actions in the natural gas 
sector.  
3.5.2. The Fiscal Reform 
China adopted a tax-sharing system in 1994, under which the central government 
collected a larger share of the major taxes and provincial governments and their localities 
split remainders. Meanwhile, with the fiscal decentralization process, the province and 
local governments have gained more rights from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
since 1994. Small-scale mines have been privatized. In 2011, a 5 percent resource tax rate 
was levied on crude oil and natural gas revenues, while other natural resources, including 
coal and other minerals, are still taxed on extracted volumes with the unchanged tax rate 
since 1984. For example, resource tax on raw coal is ¥ 2 to 5 per metric ton and ¥ 8 per 
metric ton for coking coal (Zhang, 2014). I identify the year 1994 and 2011 to indicate 
fiscal reforms and apply similar interaction approach in the IV specification.  
Table 2-10 shows the results on testing impacts of the fiscal reform in resource- growth 
relations. Evidence suggest that the 1994 fiscal reform did not shift the insignificant 
relation between oil, natural gas revenues, and regional growth. Nor did the 2011 
resource tax rate change for oil and natural gas. On the other hand, the significant effect 
of the year 1994 and 2011 on the coal revenue might be either driven by the privatization 
process of small-scale mines since 1994, or the overlap with the market price reform on 
coal since 1993. In summary, no convincing evidence is shown to indicate any impact of 
the fiscal reform on altering the resource-growth relations across Chinese provinces.  
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3.5.3. The Western Development Strategy 
 
I adopt a difference-in-difference specification to test the impact of the Western 
Development Strategy in the resource-growth relation. Ten provinces or province 
equivalent regions26 in the Western Development Strategy are identified with the dummy 
variable WestPolicy. The period is then divided into before 2000 and since 2000 with the 
dummy variable Since2000. I then add three variables into the basic IV specification in 
equation (2): two dummy variables WestPolicy, Since2000, and the interaction term of 
the resource revenue measure, WestPolicy, and Since2000.  Table 11 shows the results. 
Coefficients of interaction terms show the average treatment effect of the Western 
Development Strategy.  
Evidence shows a significant and positive average treatment effect of the Western 
Development Strategy is (column (2) in Table 2-11). The total resource revenue increases 
provincial growth more in the ten western provinces after the Western Development 
Strategy in 2000. A stronger resource – growth relation in western regions after 2000 is 
not surprising since the Western Development Strategy focuses on exploiting the 
resources in the western provinces more intensively and efficiently. The results are 
consistent with Ji, Magnus, and Wang (2014) using a kernel estimator that the Western 
Development Strategy has promoted the regional growth through natural gas and coal.  
 
 
                                                          
 
26 It was not 12 because Tibet is not in my sample, and Chongqing municipality is combined into Sichuan 
province to be consistent throughout the time period.  
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3.6. Conclusions 
Using panel data from 1990 to 2015, I compared the effects of resource revenues on the 
economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and American 
states. To address the endogeneity issue of resource revenues with regional economic 
conditions, I employ the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy and instrument the resource 
revenue with a product of the resource reserves in 1990 and the national primary energy 
prices.  The comparison between the two largest energy-producing nations in the world 
shed light on the resource – growth relation in distinct economic systems and institution 
arrangements.  
    Evidence suggests that resource revenues increase the regional growth in both China 
and the U.S. with a larger and more statistically significant effect shown across U.S. 
states. The booming resources, coal in China, oil and natural gas in the U.S., contribute to 
the positive resource – growth relation in the short term.  However, resource revenues 
show negative effects on growth-related factors, such as education attainments and R&D 
activities while pushing up the investment across regions. This cast concerns on the long-
term economic growth in resource-rich regions.  
    Further testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g. the market price 
reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show that the market 
price reform together with the privatization process on coal resources contribute the 
positive resource effect in China. The Western Development Strategy also show a 
positive effect on strength the resource – growth relation in western provinces. On the 
other hand, with all natural resources owned by the state and majority managed by the 
state-owned enterprises, the fiscal reform does not seem to matter in the resource – 
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growth relation in the China case with my results. In summary, evidence point to the 
direction that building a market system that relies on efficient price signals for resource 
allocation thus promote economic growth.  
    This study can be extended in several directions. A long panel specification would hint 
persistent factors that alter the resource –growth relation, as well as the dynamic between 
natural resources and regional institutions in different institution arrangements across 
nations. The negative resource effects on educational attainments and R&D activities in 
the results suggests a potential reverse of the resource – growth relation in the long-run.  
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3.7. Tables in Chapter 3 
Table 3-1 Key Resource-related Policy Summary, China 
Time Market Price Reform Fiscal Reform Regional Policy 
1993 
Coal price: two-track 
system for non-utility 
coal and power coal  
  
1994  
Adopted a tax-sharing 
system between central 
and provincial 
government; onshore 
resource taxes are 
assigned to provincial 
government 
 
1998 Crude oil price linked to the international price   
2000   
Large-Scale 
Development Strategy 
for the Western Region 
(12 provinces or 
equivalent)  
- infrastructure to 
transfer electricity, 
water, and gas from 
western to east 
- railroad  construction  
2003 
Coal price: abolished its 
guidance price for power 
coal and set price bands 
for negotiations between 
coal producers and 
electricity generators. 
  
2010 
Increase natural gas 
wellhead price by 
230 m/¥3, making it as 
1,150 m/¥3 (about 4.68 
$/ft3) 
  
2011  
Installed an ad valorem 
resource tax of 5% on 
oil and natural gas, 
instead of taxes levied 
on extracted volume 
since 1985 
 
Note: Author summarized.  
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Table 3-2 1994 Fiscal Reform in China 
 
Central - Province split 
ration 
(n% : n%) 
Share over the total tax 
revenue from mining 
industry in 2015 (%) 
Value-Added Tax 75 : 25 49.27 
Income Tax 60 : 40 24.33 
Resource Tax Onshore resources 0 : 100 Offshore resources 100 : 0 15.88 
Resource Compensation 
Fee 50 : 50 ---- 
Source: Author summarized based on Hou (2016) and Lin (2016).  
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Table 3-3 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition (China and the U.S.) and Units 
Resource variables  
Resource Revenue per capita  Sum of all per capita revenues from crude oil, natural gas and coal production, 1,000 real currency1 per person 
Oil Revenue per capita 
Product of field crude oil production and provincial or 
state crude oil first purchase price, 1,000 real currency 
per person 
Gas Revenue per capita 
Product of natural gas marketed production and 
provincial or state natural gas wellhead price, 1,000 real 
currency per person 
Coal Revenue per capita 
 
Product of coal production and regional average coal 
price, 1,000 real currency per person 
Oil Reserve in 1990 2 
 
Crude oil proved reserves by provinces/states in 1990, 
million barrels 
Gas Reserve in 1990 2 Natural Gas, Wet After Lease Separation Proved Reserves by provinces/states in 1990, billion cubic feet 
Coal Reserve in 1990 2 Recoverable coal reserves by provinces/states in 1990, million metric tons 
Oil Price National crude oil first purchase price in China and the U.S., real currency per barrel 
Gas Price  National natural gas wellhead price in China and the U.S.3, real currency per 1,000 cubic feet 
Coal Price National average coal price in China and the U.S., real currency per metric ton 
Growth-related variables China U.S. 
GDP per capita Growth The annual growth rate of GDP per capita in 2009 RMB (Chinese provinces) or in 2009 $ (U.S. states), % 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in 2009 RMB or in 2009 $  
Investment Share 
Percent of gross increase 
in fixed assets over 
GDP, % 
Percent of gross private 
investment over GDP 4, % 
College Population Share Percent of total population with a college or higher degree 
R&D Expenditure Share 
Percent of government 
R&D expenditure over 
government total 
expenditure, % 
Percent of total R&D 
expenditure over GDP, % 
Patent per 1,000 persons The number of patents granted per 1,000 persons 
The number of utility 
patent5 granted per 1,000 
persons 
Duty Crimes per million 
persons 
The number of duty 
crimes6 convicted per 
million persons 
The number of public 
official corruption 
convictions per million 
persons 
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Sources: The China annual provincial data are from the China Statistical Yearbook and 
the China Economic Information Network (CEINET). The resource data of the U.S. 
states are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The U.S. state GDP 
data are from the Reginal Economic Accounts, the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The U.S. state level gross private investment. R&D, 
patent, and corruption data are taken from Yamarik (2013), National Science 
Foundations, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the U.S. Department of Justice.  
Note: 1 – all monetary values, e.g. revenues and prices, are in real 2009 currency value. 
2 – The reserve data for China are only available since 2003. The reserve values are 
constructed using an estimate of the reserves in 1990, obtained by adding extraction 
flows from 1990 to 2003 to 2003 reserves. 
3 – The data on the wellhead price in the U.S. are only available till 2012. Data for the 
year 2013 to 2015 are replaced with Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price.  
4 – Yamarik (2013) provided the state gross private investment estimation from 1990 to 
2007 in the U.S. State investment share data of 2008 to 2015 are constructed based on 
real investment in fixed assets nationwide and the share of the state investment over the 
U.S. total investment in 2007. 
5 – Utility patent is a type of patent on inventions. Based on the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), more than 90 percent of all patents are utility patents in 
2015. 
6 – Duty crimes are crimes that committed by working personnel in government or state-
owned companies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, such as corruption, bribery, 
engaging in malpractices for personal gain, abuse their powers, and neglect their duties. 
 
 
 
73 
Table 3-4 Summary Statistics and Comparison, 1990-2015 
 Unit 
China U.S. Mean Ratio 
(China/U.S.) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Resource Variables 
Resource Revenue per capita 1,000 ¥ or $ per person 1.42 2.69 1.63 4.87 0.13 
Oil Revenue per capita 1,000 ¥ or $ per person 0.68 1.83 0.80 3.30 0.12 
Gas Revenue per capita 1,000 ¥ or $ per person 0.06 0.20 0.52 1.88 0.02 
Coal Revenue per capita 1,000 ¥ or $ per person 0.67 1.65 0.31 1.12 0.32 
Oil Reserve in 1990 Million barrels 997.70 1,890.88 468.12 1,459.49 2.13 
Gas Reserve in 1990 Billion cubic feet 2,764.27 5,464.07 2,913.10 6,987.95 0.95 
Coal Reserve in 1990 Million metric tons 12,047.17 23,022.02 468.52 1,035.06 25.71 
Oil Price ¥ or $ per barrel 465.74 282.42 45.39 26.33 1.50 
Gas Price ¥ or $ per 1,000 cubic feet 24.44 5.92 4.04 1.74 0.89 
Coal Price ¥ or $ per metric ton 383.60 132.84 30.91 6.06 1.80 
Growth-related variables 
GDP per capita Growth  % 9.64 5.43 1.44 2.61 6.70 
GDP per capita  ¥ or $, real 2009 19,015 17,718 42,545 9,435 0.07 
Investment Share % 0.47 0.22 8.51 4.02 0.06 
College Population Share % 6.43 5.75 25.25 5.44 0.25 
R&D Expenditure Share % 1.27 1.02 2.06 1.52 0.62 
Patent per 1,000 persons # 0.25 0.55 0.25 0.19 1.01 
Duty Crimes per Million persons # 43.41 32.96 3.17 2.90 13.67 
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Note: data cover annual measurement from 1990 to 2015; there are 750 observations in China and 1300 observations in the U.S.; all 
monetary values, e.g. revenues and prices, are in real 2009 currency value; the mean ratio of monetary value variables are calculated 
using the World Bank annual average nominal exchange rate in 2009, that is 1 U.S. dollar = 6.83 Chinese yuan.
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Table 3-5 Resource Effects on Growth of GDP per capita, Annual Panel, 1990-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
Resource Revenue 0.153 0.505**       
    [1.42] (0.108) (0.200)       
Oil Revenue   0.145 -0.093     
    [0.68]   (0.164) (0.186)     
Gas Revenue     0.282 0.628   
    [0.06]     (1.174) (0.994)   
Coal Revenue       0.154 0.529** 
    [0.67]       (0.147) (0.208) 
Observations 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 
adj. R2 0.539 0.509 0.538 0.997 0.538 0.517 0.539 0.512 
Kleibergen-Paap F-
stat (1st Stage)  89.053  208.808  414.396  103.729 
 
Panel B – U.S. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
Resource Revenue 0.259*** 0.392***       
    [1.63] (0.052) (0.147)       
Oil Revenue   0.319*** 0.426**     
    [0.80]   (0.043) (0.187)     
Gas Revenue     0.200*** 0.308***   
    [0.52]     (0.060) (0.119)   
Coal Revenue       0.110 -0.204 
    [0.31]       (0.236) (0.597) 
N 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 
adj. R2 0.434 0.401 0.433 0.969 0.405 0.378 0.400 0.370 
Kleibergen-Paap 
F-stat (1st Stage) 
 27.274  28.098  77.085  93.943 
Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.64 % in China and 1.44 % in the U.S.; 
variable means are listed in [ ] with 1,000 currency per capita unit; point estimates of 
resource revenues are summarized; IV columns instrument resource revenue measures 
with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for all 
resources, and crude oil, natural gas and coal respectively. Province/state and year fixed 
effects, and controls, including investment share, college share, R&D expenditure share, 
patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons are included. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent 
level, *** at 1 percent level. 
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Table 3-6 Resource Effects on Regional Growth, Five-year Panels, 1990-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
Resource 
Revenue 
0.216 0.668***       
    [1.34] (0.135) (0.203)       
Oil Revenue   -0.005 -0.332     
    [0.64]   (0.167) (0.243)     
Gas Revenue     0.772 0.647   
    [0.06]     (1.510) (1.153)   
Coal Revenue       0.458*** 0.698*** 
    [0.63]       (0.110) (0.213) 
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
R2 0.712 0.575 0.701 0.605 0.703 0.621 0.723 0.639 
Kleibergen-
Paap F-stat (1st 
Stage) 
 
14.183  17.668  98.844  22.322 
 
Panel B – U.S. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
Resource 
Revenue 
0.173*** 0.231***       
    [1.61] (0.062) (0.081)       
Oil Revenue   0.260*** 0.394*     
    [0.79]   (0.093) (0.217)     
Gas Revenue     0.109** 0.025   
    [0.51]     (0.052) (0.083)   
Coal 
Revenue 
      0.557*** 0.866*** 
    [0.30]       (0.104) (0.256) 
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
R2 0.653 0.554 0.659 0.551 0.610 0.503 0.613 0.507 
Kleibergen-
Paap F-stat 
(1st Stage) 
 
17.962  8.989  25.740  153.187 
Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.08 % in China and 1.39 % in the U.S.; variable 
means are listed in [] with 1,000 currency per capita unit; point estimates of resource revenues are 
summarized; IV columns instrument resource revenue measures with the product of resource 
reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for all resources, and crude oil, natural gas and 
coal respectively. Province/state and year fixed effects, and controls, including investment share, 
college share, R&D expenditure share, patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million 
persons are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent 
level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level. 
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Table 3-7 Resource Effects on Growth Factors, All resources 
Panel A – China Investment Share College Share R&D Share Patent  Duty Crime 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
           
Resource Revenue 0.012* 0.014*** -0.083 -0.141*** -0.109*** -0.135*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.494 0.115 
    [1.42] (0.007) (0.003) (0.101) (0.042) (0.036) (0.014) (0.022) (0.008) (1.108) (0.723) 
           
Dependent Variable Mean  0.47  6.43  1.27  0.25  43.41 
Observations 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 
R2 0.834 0.826 0.898 0.893 0.589 0.568 0.710 0.698 0.552 0.531 
Kleibergen-Paap  
F-stat (1st Stage) 
 96.333  96.333  96.333  96.333  96.333 
 
Panel B – U.S. Investment Share College Share R&D Share Patent  Corruptions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
           
Resource Revenue 0.134 0.383*** -0.069** -0.055 -0.023** -0.025** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.071 0.320* 
    [1.63] (0.119) (0.126) (0.032) (0.163) (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.102) (0.171) 
           
Dependent Variable Mean  8.51  25.25  2.06  0.25  3.17 
Observations 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 
R2 0.637 0.603 0.663 0.649 0.144 0.108 0.302 0.269 0.024 0.115 
Kleibergen-Paap  
F-stat (1st Stage) 
 33.319  33.319  33.319  33.319  33.319 
Note: variable means are listed in [ ] with 1,000 currency per capita unit; point estimates of resource revenues are summarized; IV 
columns instrument resource revenue measures with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for all 
resources, and crude oil, natural gas and coal respectively. Province/state and year fixed effects, and controls are included. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level.
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Table 3-8 Resource Effects on Growth Factors, Oil vs. Natural Gas vs. Coal, IV 
specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Investment Share 
College 
Share 
R&D 
Share Patent 
Duty 
Crime 
      
China 
Oil Revenue 0.0001 0.048 -0.119*** -0.037*** -5.497*** 
[0.68] (0.003) (0.053) (0.019) (0.008) (1.205) 
      
Gas Revenue 0.075** 0.046 -1.019*** -0.540*** 1.955 
[0.06] (0.033) (0.482) (0.166) (0.099) (3.572) 
      
Coal Revenue 0.015*** -0.160*** -0.133*** -0.067*** 0.913 
[0.67] (0.003) (0.044) (0.016) (0.008) (0.744) 
       
U.S. 
Oil Revenue 0.563*** -0.076 -0.047*** -0.014*** 0.380* 
[0.80] (0.171) (0.206) (0.014) (0.005) (0.220) 
      
Gas Revenue 0.448*** -0.214*** 0.036 -0.005*** 0.163 
[0.52] (0.125) (0.072) (0.026) (0.002) (0.194) 
      
Coal Revenue 3.175*** 0.096 -0.211*** -0.037*** 0.523 
[0.31] (0.564) (0.273) (0.044) (0.008) (0.518) 
      
Note: variable means are listed in [ ] with 1,000 currency per capita unit; point estimates 
of specific resource revenues with Instrumental Variable models are summarized, which 
instrument resource revenue measures with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and 
the national resource prices for crude oil, natural gas, and coal respectively. 
Province/state and year fixed effects, and controls, including investment share, college 
share, R&D expenditure share, patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million 
persons, are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 
percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level. 
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Table 3-9 The China Case – Market Price Reform Impacts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
CoalRevenue -0.009** -0.010**       
 (0.004) (0.005)       
CoalRevenue*Year1993-2002 8.650** 7.807**       
 (3.793) (3.876)       
CoalRevenue*Since2003 9.013** 10.451**       
 (4.280) (4.841)       
OilRevenue   0.002* 0.001     
   (0.001) (0.002)     
OilRevenue*Since1998   -1.853 -0.706     
   (1.095) (1.384)     
GasRevenue     -0.078* -0.137 -0.026 -0.088 
     (0.041) (0.166) (0.022) (0.057) 
GasRevenue*Year1993-2002     87.688** 90.492   
     (41.655) (159.273)   
GasRevenue*Since2003     78.310* 136.177   
     (41.118) (165.228)   
GasRevenue*Since1998       26.066 88.295 
       (22.196) (56.543) 
Observations 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 
R2 0.546 0.523 0.540 0.517 0.550 0.506 0.540 0.503 
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (1st Stage)  11.487  53.478  17.344  26.761 
Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.64 % in China; Year1993-2002 = 1 if year is between 1993 and 2002; Since2003 = 
1 if year is 2003 or later; Since1998 = 1 if year is 1998 or later; point estimates of resource revenues are summarized; IV columns 
instrument resource specific revenue measures with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for coal 
and crude oil respectively; province/state and year fixed effects, and controls, including investment share, college share, R&D 
expenditure share, patent per 1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons are included. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level. 
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Table 3-10 The China Case – the Fiscal Reform Impacts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE IV FE IV FE IV 
OilRevenue 0.365 0.304     
 (2.399) (3.530)     
OilRevenue*Year1994-2010 -0.193 -0.306     
 (2.409) (3.426)     
OilRevenue*Since2011 -0.230 -0.452     
 (2.400) (3.448)     
GasRevenue   -51.400 -18.067   
   (35.131) (99.510)   
GasRevenue*Year1994-2010   52.200 19.978   
   (35.371) (99.074)   
GasRevenue*Since2011   51.409 18.132   
   (35.099) (99.366)   
CoalRevenue     -5.562** -5.057** 
     (2.433) (2.446) 
CoalRevenue*Year1994-2010     5.950** 5.972** 
     (2.435) (2.320) 
CoalRevenue*Since2011     5.554** 5.033** 
     (2.442) (2.394) 
Observations 725 725 725 725 725 725 
R2 0.537 0.514 0.544 0.520 0.547 0.521 
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (1st 
Stage) 
 42.623  16.832  26.464 
Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.64 % in China; Year1994-2010 = 1 if 
year is between 1994 and 2010; Since2011 = 1 if year is 2011 or later; IV columns 
instrument resource revenue measures with the product of resource reserves in 1990 and 
the national resource prices for all resources; Province/state and year fixed effects, and 
controls, including investment share, college share, R&D expenditure share, patent per 
1,000 persons, and duty crimes per million persons are included. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 
percent level.  
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Table 3-11 The China Case – West Development Policy Impacts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
ResourceRevenue 0.003 -0.404       
 (0.121) (0.358)       
ResourceRevenue*WestPolicy*Since2000 0.313** 1.280***       
 (0.145) (0.334)       
OilRevenue   0.093 -0.272     
   (0.118) (0.167)     
OilRevenue*WestPolicy*Since2000   -0.063 0.265     
   (0.200) (0.237)     
GasRevenue     -16.322* -31.426   
     (9.872) (19.441)   
GasRevenue*WestPolicy*Since2000     17.294* 32.618*   
     (9.828) (19.106)   
CoalRevenue       -0.499* -0.534 
       (0.278) (0.393) 
CoalRevenue*WestPolicy*Since2000       1.120*** 1.692*** 
       (0.301) (0.450) 
WestPolicy -1.862*** -3.215*** -1.226** -1.277*** -1.367*** -1.403*** -2.181*** -2.868*** 
 (0.482) (0.594) (0.476) (0.482) (0.474) (0.481) (0.472) (0.517) 
Since2000 5.148*** 5.151*** 5.168*** 5.235*** 5.113*** 5.037*** 5.209*** 5.219*** 
 (0.553) (0.559) (0.552) (0.548) (0.541) (0.554) (0.551) (0.560) 
Observations 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 
R2 0.218 0.155 0.206 0.198 0.212 0.208 0.235 0.218 
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (1st Stage)  77.772  230.668  38.831  55.102 
Note: the mean GDP per capita annual growth is 9.64 % in China; WestPolicy = 1 if provinces are in the West Development Policy; Since2000 = 
1 if year is 2000 or later; point estimates of resource revenues are summarized; IV columns instrument resource revenue measures with the product 
of resource reserves in 1990 and the national resource prices for resources respectively; province/state and year fixed effects, and controls are 
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significances: * at 10 percent level, **at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level.
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3.8. Figures in Chapter 3 
 
Figure 3-1 Total Primary Energy Production by Resource Types, China vs. the U.S. 
Note: Author conducted based on data from China Statistic Year Book and the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
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Panel A Crude Oil Production 
 
Panel B Natural Gas Production 
 
Panel C Coal Production 
 
Figure 3-2 Three Main Resource Production Comparisons: China vs. the U.S. 
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Figure 3-3 Resource Reserves in 1990 Comparison: China vs. the U.S. 
Note: Author conducted based on data from China Statistic Year Book and the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
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Panel A Crude Oil Price (2009 real $ per barrel) 
 
Panel B Natural Gas Price (2009 real $ per million cubic feet) 
Panel C Coal Price (2009 $ per metric ton) 
 
Figure 3-4 Three Main Resource Price Comparisons: China vs. the U.S. vs. the World 
Sources: China Statistic Year Book, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
and the World Bank Commodity Price Data (“the pink sheet”).  
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Figure 3-5 Regional Development Strategies in China 
Source: Map of Chinese economic regions, based on File:China_provinces_blank.svg.  
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Chapter 4 The Effects of the Recent Oil and Gas Boom on Schooling Decisions in 
the U.S. 
4.1. Introduction 
Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies have induced an oil and gas 
drilling boom in the U.S. since the 2000s, which has had demonstrated impacts on local 
income, employment and wage increases (Weber 2012 and 2013; Weinstein 2014; Allcott 
and Keniston 2014; Fetzer 2014).  Combined with the vast literature showing technology 
breakthroughs are often associated with rises in the returns to skilled labor (Goldin and 
Katz 1996; Galor and Tsiddon 1997; Acemoglu 1998; Acemoglu 2002), makes it 
tempting to conclude that schooling will rise with the arrival of an energy boom. 
However, such an inference ignores the fact that many new jobs related to the energy 
boom are task-skill based – meaning that education and work experience requirements for 
entry are low – and have the potential to raise the opportunity cost of schooling 
significantly. During energy boom periods, increased demand for and earnings of task-
skill labor with low education requirements could widen the wage differential and 
increase the opportunity cost of staying in school, thus drawing teenagers out of school 
(Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005b; Emery, Ferrer and Green 2012). This paper 
exploits variation in timing and spatial patterns of oil and gas well drilling activities to 
confirm the negative boom-schooling relation across 15 U.S. states between 2000 and 
2013. 
    The schooling impacts of the recent shale oil and gas boom are of interest for several 
reasons. First, conventional thought among policy-makers is that the boom benefits the 
economy with jobs and enhances U.S. efforts to achieve energy independence.  The 
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major concerns so far lie in potential environmental degradation through water pollution, 
air pollution, congestion, and ecosystem changes (Kargbo, Wilhelm and Campbell 2010; 
Roy, Adams and Robinson 2014; Rozell and Reaven 2011; Parker et al. 2014). Second, 
human capital has long been recognized as an important factor to economic growth 
(Lucas 1988; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992) and a main channel causing the resource 
curse (Gylfason 1999; Stijns 2006; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004), which observes low 
economic growth in resource-rich regions. Therefore, understanding the particular 
schooling impacts of the energy boom is important for designing development policies 
that can increase short-run growth rates without trading off long-run education levels.  
    New job opportunities driven by the energy boom may have two offsetting effects. On 
the one hand, when the energy boom brings skill-biased jobs and increases the earnings 
of task-skill labor, it increases the opportunity costs of staying in school – the local labor 
market channel. On the other hand, the energy boom may increase school resources 
through increasing the local tax base, thus increasing student retention – the school 
resource channel. Which effect dominates during periods of energy boom is an empirical 
question.  
    This study exploits county and year variation in drilling activities across 1170 counties 
in 15 oil/gas production states between 2000 and 2013. The instrumental variable 
approach with various fixed effects provides estimates of how this recent oil and gas 
boom affected high school enrollment at the county level. The evidence shows that grade 
9 to 12 enrollment decreases in counties and years with intensive drilling activities. The 
magnitudes I find suggest that for every four oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 
laborers, one student out of a hundred that could have enrolled would not enroll in grade 
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11 and 12 on average.  In other words, given that the drilling density is 7.58 and that total 
count of grade 11 and 12 enrolled students is 1,962 in an average county during a year, 
about 36 fewer students per county and overall 41,760 fewer students across the 15 states 
enrolled in grade 11 and 12 with the energy boom. 
    The results are consistent with the findings in the literature exploring the 1970s energy 
boom (Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005b). Closest to this paper, Cascio and Narayan 
(2015) find fracking has increased high school dropout rates of male teens across the U.S. 
at the commute zone level since 2005. This paper improves on these studies by drawing 
on rich well drilling data at an annual frequency that both identifies the location, timing, 
and intensity of the oil and gas boom and allows me to explore heterogeneous effects.  
4.2. Background and Related Literature  
4.2.1. The Energy Boom, Drilling Activities, and Local Impact Literature 
Since the 2000s, oil and gas extraction has rapidly increased from shale formations. 
Compared to conventional gas deposits, which are in permeable rocks typically located 
much closer to the surface, shale deposits are trapped in fine-grained sedimentary rocks 
with very low permeability and located 1,000 to 13,500 feet below the surface (Joskow 
2013). When used in conjunction with horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing27 enables 
gas producers to extract shale gas economically. The Barnett shale play in the middle 
north of Texas became the first production shale gas play when Mitchell Energy made it 
                                                          
 
27 Hydraulic fracturing (commonly called "fracking") is a technique in which water, chemicals, and sand 
are pumped into the well to unlock the hydrocarbons trapped in shale formations by opening cracks 
(fractures) in the rock and allowing natural gas to flow from the shale into the well. Simply, fracking is the 
production of natural gas from shale rock by bombarding it with water and chemicals. 
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commercially viable by getting costs down to $4 per million British Thermal Units in 
1998.  
When cost-reducing technologies, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
techniques in this case, met the higher prices of crude oil in the early 2000s, the shale gas 
industry surged.  U.S. shale gas production increased by 14-fold from 2000 to 2010, and 
the production mostly lies in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and a major field 
that covers much of the Northeast (centered on Pennsylvania) called the Marcellus shale. 
Based on the well record data collected from various state agencies, figure 1 shows the 
time trend of the oil/gas well drilling activities in 15 oil and gas production states in the 
U.S. since 1900.  In general, the 2000s energy boom is significant from a historical 
perspective yet not as intense as the 1970s-1980s boom. Traditional oil and gas states 
such as Texas and Oklahoma still dominate drilling activities. In Texas, oil/gas well 
drilling peaked at 30,670 wells drilled in 1985 and the recent boom featured a high of 
23,200 oil/gas wells drilled in 2012. However, in some states, the recent energy boom is 
more sizable in comparison to the 1970s-1980s boom, such as Pennsylvania, North 
Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah. In Pennsylvania, 2,276 oil/gas wells were drilled 
when the last energy boom was at its highest in 1984, whereas more than 4,000 oil/gas 
wells were drilled annually from 2006 to 2008.  
Local impact studies have documented the recent energy boom as a local economic 
shock with employment and wage increases. Based on input-output models in earlier 
economic analyses, development of Marcellus shale was found to create more than 
44,000 jobs in 2009 and more than 139,000 in 2010 ( Considine, Watson and Blumsack 
2009 and 2010). In the Barnett Shale near Fort Worth, Texas, the shale development was 
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estimated to account for almost 89,000 jobs (Perryman Group 2007, 2008, 2011). Later 
studies have questioned these results as overestimating the employment effect, with 
concern for the potential violation of critical assumptions and the industry funding 
source. Kelsey et al. (2011) used survey and GIS data to refine an input-output analysis 
and showed that Marcellus shale development in Pennsylvania created or supported about 
23,884 total jobs in 2009, which was half of what Considine et al.(2009) estimated. 
Utilizing the moratorium and later ban on fracking in New York as a natural experiment 
in the Marcellus region, Komarek (2016) found total employment and wages per job 
increased by 7% and 11% respectively above pre-boom levels in the three years after the 
boom. The results also show significant positive spillovers to related sectors, such as 
construction, transportation, retail trade, and accommodations. Employment increases 
associated with drilling are also found in Ohio (Weinstein and Partridge 2011), Colorado, 
Wyoming, and Texas (Weber 2012), the southwest four-state region of Texas, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and Oklahoma (Weber 2013), nine states in the central U.S. (Brown 2014), and 
in the lower 48 states altogether (Weinstein 2014). In the synthesis of the literature on 
local labor markets and natural resources, Marchand and Weber (2017) concluded that 
the growth in resource extraction clearly increases employment. Created jobs spill over to 
other sectors of the local economy, which were estimated as the job multiplier, varying 
from 0.3 to 3.37 in literature (Marchand and Weber 2017).  
The workforce relevant to recent oil and natural gas development can be distinguished 
from that of most other sectors. First, the drilling and production processes are much 
more labor intensive and industrial in nature than conventional shallow gas development. 
The deeper formation requires directional drilling, production stimulation, and other 
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methods to produce commercial quantities of natural gas (Brundage, Kelsey and Lobdell 
2011). Between 320 and 1365 heavy equipment truck trips are required to build out and 
bring a single well into operation (Moss 2008), implying that significant labor demand 
spills over in transportation and construction. A U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics report in 
2013 documented that employment grew by 27,954 jobs from 2007 to 2011 in the 
counties with wells in the Bakken Formation (North Dakota and Montana), of which 
38.1%  were in mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 17.5 % were in 
transportation and warehousing, and 12.9% were in construction (Ferree and Smith 
2013). 
Second, the drilling stage is the most labor demanding phase and is associated with the 
most inducement of local economic activities. Once a well is put into production, the 
workforce used in the process of drilling and the affiliated infrastructure construction will 
no longer be needed. A workforce needs assessment conducted in Pennsylvania 
(Brundage, Kelsey and Lobdell 2011) indicated that 80% of the total industry workforce 
would be required during the well drilling phase, with 18% for the pre-drilling phase and 
only 2% for the production phase after wells are drilled. Comparing the oil and gas 
production trend with related employment trends in 20 states, Weinstein (2014) also 
showed the employment growth that had accompanied the boom during the construction 
and drilling period immediately preceded the boom in production. Thus, the drilling 
phase period is often referred to as “the boom” in the oil and natural gas industries due to 
the high and sudden labor demand to perform tasks associated with natural gas 
development (Brundage, Kelsey and Lobdell 2011). 
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Third, when drilling activities were steady, the drill-related workforces were often 
transient workers who maintained temporary residency in the drilling area. With the large 
reserve and technology breakthrough of shale oil and gas, the development intensity kept 
increasing over the course of years. As a result, the industry is moving towards a 
workforce that contains fewer transient workers and more permanent local residents. For 
example, national and international drilling companies, as well as gas field service and 
construction firms, have opened regional offices in the southwest and northeast 
Pennsylvania due to the development of the Marcellus play (Brundage, Kelsey and 
Lobdell 2011). In addition, drill-related workforces spill over into boom-related labor 
demand in local services such as retail trade and accommodations, reinforcing the local 
impacts of the energy boom.  
Finally, the local labor demand related to the energy boom is task-skill biased with low 
education and work experience needed for entry. Among the ten largest occupations in 
the mining sector, most occupations require less than high school or high school diploma 
or equivalent degree, and none require working experience, except petroleum engineers 
and general and operations managers (Appendix A 3.1, panel A). Looking at the 
education attainment for workers 25 years and older in these occupations, such as 
roustabouts, service unit operators, heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers, rotary drill 
operators, 18% to 26% of the workers have less than a high school diploma, which is 
twice to three times the average rate for all occupations at 9.6% (Appendix A 3.1, panel 
B). In spill-over sectors such as retail and accommodations, the requirements are low as 
well. It is fair to conclude that this energy boom increases the demand for low-skilled 
labor.  
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In summary, driven by the technology change, an energy boom has intensively spread 
across the U.S. along shale formations. This energy boom stimulates local economic 
activities, especially employment. The labor demand triggered by the energy boom is 
largest during the drilling phase and favors task-skilled labors with lower education 
requirements.  
4.2.2. Energy Shocks and Schooling 
Human capital has long been recognized as an important factor for economic growth, and 
crowding out human capital development (e.g., education) may be a major cause of the 
resource curse, the phenomenon of low economic growth in resource-rich regions 
(Gylfason 2001; Stijns 2006; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004). Due to the low demand for a 
high-skilled labor force in resource sectors, the return to education declines with a 
resource boom (Gylfason 2001), which further decreases the incentive for educational 
investment. Gylfason (2001) showed evidence that public expenditure on education 
relative to national income, expected years of schooling for girls, and gross secondary-
school enrollment is all inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth 
across countries.  
In a subnational context, labor mobility among regions suggests analyzing this effect in 
two aspects: the high demand for task-skilled labor force can be filled either with 
immigrants to the boom region or with local laborers, including teens of high school age. 
Since the labor demand during the energy boom is biased towards low-skilled laborers, 
the former will reduce the average education attainment level in the region while the 
latter could block human capital accumulation by inducing more dropouts. In this study, I 
focus on the latter schooling effects.  
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Evidence shows that energy shocks influence schooling decisions. Black, McKinnish, 
and Sanders (2005b) utilized the substantial variation in wages available to teenagers in 
the Appalachian coal boom and bust and found that high school enrollment rates in 
Kentucky and Pennsylvania declined considerably in the 1970s during the coal boom and 
increased in the 1980s during the bust in coal-producing counties relative to counties 
without coal. The estimates indicated that a long-term 10 percent increase in the earnings 
of low-skilled workers could decrease high school enrollment rates by 5 to 7 percent. 
Focusing on the oil boom between 1970 and 1980 and college education, Kumar (2014) 
showed that the cohort reaching high school age during the oil boom was about 2 
percentage points less likely to have a college degree by the time they turned 34 to 37 
years of age in 2000. In the context of Canada, Emery, Ferrer and Green (2012) analyzed 
the effect of the OPEC oil shocks during 1973 to 1981 on the long-term human capital 
investments for Alberta birth cohorts and found that resource booms may delay education 
but do not reduce the total accumulation of human capital. 
Most recent studies have explored the boom-schooling relation in the context of the 
energy boom since the 2000s. Morissette, Chan and Lu (2015) exploited variation in 
wage growth in Canada induced by increases in world oil prices from 2001 to 2008 and 
found that the aggregate increased wages tend to reduce young men’s full-time university 
enrollment rates but showed little evidence of an effect on high school dropouts. Cascio 
and Narayan (2015) showed that fracking had increased high school dropout rates of 
male teens across the U.S. at the commute zone level. Observing all primary and 
secondary school students and teacher quality in Texas school districts, Marchand and 
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Weber (2015) found that the shale boom slightly decreased student achievement with 
teacher turnover and inexperience increased.  
4.3. Economics of the Schooling Decision 
In the classical theory by Mincer (1958) and Becker (1964), schooling decisions are 
modeled as an investment decision. As summarized in Black, McKinnish and Sanders 
(2005b): If person j does not enroll in high school, the discounted value of the flow of 
earnings is  𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = ∑
𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
(1+𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗)𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=0 , where 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the earnings of a high school dropout at time 
t and 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 is person j’s discount rate. If instead person j enrolls in school k more years to 
complete high school, the present value of the flow of earnings of person j is 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 =
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
(1+𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗)𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=𝑘𝑘 . Assuming that secondary public education is free, the student will complete 
school if 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 > 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . That is  
�
(𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖)
(1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗)𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=𝑘𝑘
−�
𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
�1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗�
𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘−1
𝑖𝑖=0
> 0 
    Under this model, the schooling decision is mainly determined by three factors: the 
wage differential between high school graduates and high school dropouts (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖), 
the opportunity cost of a high school education (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖), and the individual discount rate 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗.  
Two channels – the local labor market and school resources – further link the schooling 
decision with the energy boom in the rational investment decision framework.  The local 
impacts of energy booms on employment and earnings can be large and can spill over 
into other local sectors (Black, McKinnish and Sanders 2005a; Marchand 2012). In 
studies of the expansion of oil and gas drilling into shale formations in the 2000s, the 
estimates of new local jobs attributable to the energy boom range from 220,000 to 
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618,000 nationwide (Maniloff and Mastromonaco 2015; Cascio and Narayan 2015). 
Spillover effects have also been documented, finding that each oil and gas sector job 
creates around one to three jobs in other local sectors, especially in construction and 
transportation (Brown 2014; Fetzer 2014; Weber 2013; Marchand and Weber 2017). As 
discussed, the labor demand related to the energy boom is low-skill or task-skill biased. 
When demand for and the earnings of low-skilled labor increase with the energy boom, 
the opportunity cost of staying in school increases and the wage differential between a 
dropout and graduate of high school shrinks. Because the wage differential is positively 
related to the enrollment decision and opposite for the opportunity cost, the resource 
boom is predicted to affect school enrollment negatively.   
School resources, such as school revenues, are another channel linking the energy 
boom with schooling (Marchand and Weber 2015). The energy development could 
expand the local tax base, such as the property tax base, and directly generate revenue for 
schools (Weber, Burnett, and Xiarchos 2016), or it may increase revenue to the state 
government, which is then redistributed to schools (Raimi and Newell 2014). On the 
contrary, disamenities from energy extraction might have reduced property values 
(Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2013) and possibly shrink the local tax base. Nonetheless, 
school resources may affect student achievements, and thus schooling decisions (Gibbons 
and Mcnally 2013; Papke 2005; Unnever, Kerckhoff and Robinson 2000).  
Therefore, depending on the relative forces through two channels, the impact of the 
energy boom on the schooling decision leaves as an empirical question. 
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4.3.1. Data  
I construct a panel dataset of 1170 counties in 15 oil and gas production states, covering 
the period between 2000 and 2013. The 15 states are those that overlay the shale plays 
based on the most recent digital map by the Energy Information Administration and the 
U.S. Geological Survey in 2011 (see Figure 3-2). More specifically, the sampled states 
are New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky on Marcellus shale play, 
Michigan on Antrim shale play, Arkansas on Fayetteville play, Oklahoma on Woodford 
and other plays, Louisiana on Haynesville shale play, Texas on Barnett, Eagle Ford, and 
part of Haynesville play, North Dakota and Montana on Bakken play, and Wyoming, 
Utah, and Colorado on other scattered plays. According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), the Marcellus play (PA, WV, OH and NY) on average produced 
9.9 billion cubic feet per day in 2013, making it the most productive shale play in the 
U.S. The Haynesville play (LA & TX) and the Barnett play (TX) produced 5.02 and 4.64 
billion cubic feet per day each, coming as second and third in shale gas production. The 
oil and gas production in these 15 states constitutes 82.70% of the overall production in 
the U.S. in 2010, increasing from 67.25% in 2000. 
4.3.2. Identify the Energy Boom 
Four types of indicators have been applied in the literature to identify the energy boom: 
energy reserves, energy production, employment in the energy industry, and drilling 
activities measured by the number of wells drilled. If local labor demand shocks are 
indeed the mechanism linking the energy boom to teenage schooling decisions, it is ideal 
to have an employment measure that counts both the direct employment effects in the 
energy industry and the spillover employment effects from the energy development, such 
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as in construction, transportation, services, and the retail sector. However, the overall 
employment effects related to energy boom are difficult to measure. Without an accurate 
direct employment measure, the timing of a boom is better identified when the measure 
identifies the phase of energy development with the largest local employment effects. 
The initial drilling phase shows the highest labor requirements, compared to the mature 
production phase (Weinstein 2014; Kelsey, Partridge and White 2016). Brundage, Kelsey 
and Lobdell (2011) assessed that each wet gas well in southwest Pennsylvania requires 
the equivalent of 13.1 full-time jobs, spread across almost 150 occupations and 420 
individuals, during the year when drilling and well completion occur on the well site, but 
only 0.18 full-time job equivalents during each of that well’s subsequent producing years. 
Kelsey et al. (2011) further concluded that labor requirements and therefore most of the 
employment-based effects are highest during the active drilling years and largely are 
driven by the number of wells drilled per year. Therefore, a production measure will 
more likely lag the boom in employment requirements. While the energy reserve is 
arguably the most exogenous measure among the four, the lack of time variation makes it 
difficult to identify the timing of a boom. With drilling activities highly related to 
exogenous factors such as energy deposits distribution across the country, the measure of 
newly drilled well counts identifies the location, timing, duration and, finally, the 
intensity of the oil and gas development.  
Comprehensive well records, including the timing and location of drilling for each oil 
and gas well, are requested from various state agencies28. Based on the spud date – the 
                                                          
 
28 State agencies such as Dept. of Natural Resource, Dept. of Environment Protect/Commission, Industrial 
Commission (ND, OK), and Geological Survey (AR, KY).  
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day that the drilling starts for a well – in well records, I then constructed the number of 
oil and gas wells drilled, the well spud, by year by county. Since a newly drilled well will 
have much more muted effects on local labor market conditions in a large county than in 
a small rural county, I further divide the well spud by the number of the labor force. As 
labor force counts may be endogenous to drilling activities, I use the labor force of the 
initial sample period in 2000. Equation (1) shows the main identification variable: the 
drilling density, which is the number of oil and gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers 
by county (c) by year (t).  
(1)  𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 =
𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔 𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 1,000 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐,2000
 
This unique drilling measure displays significant temporal and spatial variation within 
the energy boom. Figure 3 shows the time trends of average drilling density across the 
sample. In general, drilling activities took off after 2002 until the Great Recession in 
2008 and surged again after 2009. Beyond averages, there are significant differences in 
the timing of drilling in booming counties. The fast growing activity since 2010 is mostly 
driven by top drilling counties in Texas and North Dakota. While in Pennsylvania, the 
drilling activities began in earnest around 2006 and 2007. Some counties saw a peak of 
the boom around 2005, e.g. Johnson County in Wyoming or Yuma County in Colorado, 
while a few counties boomed around 2000, e.g. Campbell County in Wyoming or Terrell 
County in Texas 29.  
                                                          
 
29 Since the drill density measure counts both conventional and unconventional oil and gas well, it is not 
surprising to see the early 2000s boom. Conventional and unconventional drillings are correlated and both 
could trigger demand shock in local labor markets. I argue that there is no reason to distinguish them in this 
study. 
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Figure 3-4 further compares the spatial variation of the drilling density across all 
sample counties in the year 2000 and 2013. In 2000, 555 counties, about 47% of the 
sample, did not experience any oil/gas well drilling. The number of zero drilling counties 
increases to 687 in 2013. Meanwhile, the oil and gas drillings became enormously intense 
and highly concentrated in a few areas. In both 2000 and 2013, drilling densities at the 
90th percentile are around 7 to 8 wells per initial 1,000 labors. Then they surged to about 
86 wells in 2000 and 197 wells at the 99th percentile.  In the densest drilling county, Love 
county in Texas, the drilling density increased from 265 well drilled per 1,000 labors in 
2000 to 3,857 well drilled per 1,000 labors in 2013, indicating almost 15 times increase.  
The top 1% counties – 117 counties – were drilling hundreds of more times than the other 
counties. These top drilling counties in 2013 were concentrated in south and southwest of 
Texas, the border corner among Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado, and west of North 
Dakota.  
4.3.3. Schooling Decisions in High School and Controls 
I focus on grade 11 to 12 high school enrollment to measure aggregated schooling 
decisions of high schoolers by county by year. Age 16 to 18 is the exposure age period to 
low-skill job opportunities. In the U.S., the Fair Labor Standards Act allows teenagers 
aged 14 to 15 to work outside school hours and teenagers aged 16 to 17 to work 
unlimited hours30. The compulsory school attendance law varies by state and ends from 
                                                          
 
30 Fair Labor Standards Act listed Mining as hazardous job that teenage age 14 to 17 should not work in. 
However, I argue that with a local labor demand shock triggered by drilling, low-skill job opportunities are 
not only in mining but also in non-tradable sectors like service and retails. 
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age 16 to 18 (Table 2-5). Thus, grade 11 to 12 high schoolers provides a feasible age 
group to investigate the boom-schooling relation.   
     I obtain the main outcome variable, the enrollment count of grade 11 and 12, from the 
Common Core of Data (CCD) by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). I 
prefer the Common Core of Data (CCD) to household survey data because the sample 
size of either the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) prevents accurate estimates in rural areas, such as locals where the population is 
under 65,000. This is important because most of the natural gas production takes place in 
nonmetro-noncore counties where the population is less than 20,000 (Brown, Weber, and 
Wojan 2013). Given that it is a universe data collection from administrative records in 
state education agencies, the data is relatively accurate and reliable without sampling 
errors. However, the limitations are the omission of data on private schools, and the data 
can be sensitive to student mobility patterns. The student mobility issue needs special 
attention in this study because when a resource boom draws immigrants from outside the 
region, the local high school enrollment could increase. Thus, the schooling measures 
based on CCD could be overestimated due to the migrant effect31. 
    Drawing on the review of Rumberger and Lim (2008), I further identify three sets of 
control variables that may affect schooling at the high school level in the U.S.: schooling 
conditions, e.g. pupil-teacher ratio, total revenue per student, total expenditure per 
student, percentage school revenue from local funding sources; economic conditions, e.g. 
                                                          
 
31 There are observations with the calculated enrollment rate and/or the AFGR greater than 100%. It could 
be due to migrant effect or other measurement error. In the proceeding empirical analysis, I imputed those 
greater-than-100% observations with 100%. 
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median household income, income per capita, poverty rate, job numbers, unemployment 
rate, earnings per job; and demographic measures, e.g. population density,  population 
share of black, Hispanic, senior, and crime rate. All schooling condition data are from 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). I gather other county-level control data 
from the Census Bureau’s U.S. Counties database. The U.S. Counties database pulls 
together various databases from the federal government and summarizes key information 
at the county level32. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the data. 
4.4. Empirical Model 
4.4.1. Empirical Specification 
In order to determine the impact of drilling activities on the schooling of grade 11 and 12, 
I regress high school enrollment on oil and gas related well-drilling density: 
(2) 𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝜸𝜸′𝑿𝑿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 + 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖  + 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖  
𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 is the natural logarithm of the grade 11 and 12 enrollment count in county c state s in 
year t. An alternative measure, grade 9 to 12 enrollment rate, is also used to check 
robustness. 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 is the number of oil and gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 
laborers in county c state s in year t. I then include county fixed effects, 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺, and state-by-
year fixed effect, 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖, where s indexes the state. Observed time-variant variables are 
controlled in vector 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖, as listed in detail in the end of session 4.3.3. 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 represents all 
remaining unobserved determinants of outcomes. The county fixed effects account for 
unobserved determinants of schooling that are common to the same county over time. 
                                                          
 
32 Unfortunately, the U.S. Counties database terminated in 2009. I traced to the original data sources to 
update the data through 2013. 
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State-by-year fixed effects control for the general schooling trend and shocks to all 
counties, as well as the state-level shocks, such as changes in state education policy or 
other aggregate economic development.   
    The empirical strategy compares the average high school enrollment during time 
periods when oil and gas wells are drilled intensively to time periods in the same county 
when it did not receive such a shock. I flexibly control for time trend using schooling in 
counties where no drilling activities are observed during others’ booming periods. I now 
turn to discussing the potential threats to the identification and present an instrumentation 
strategy. 
4.4.2. Threats to Identification and Instrumentation Strategy  
I discuss three econometric concerns: omitted variables, reverse causality, and 
measurement error. Omitted variables will bias coefficients if a third factor affects both a 
county’s schooling level and its attractiveness as a location for oil and gas wells. County 
fixed effects sweep out time-invariant features of the county.  State-by-year fixed effects 
control for omitted variables that change over time within a state and across the U.S.  
Three omitted variables may affect schooling and correlate with de-trended local drilling 
activities. First, there may be local demand shocks that both affect schooling decisions 
and alter the demand for drilling outputs - oil and gas. My focus on oil and gas industries 
mitigates this concern as most demand for energy comes from national or foreign rather 
than local consumers. Second, states or counties can influence whether or not large scale 
extraction occurs in their area. Due to the potential local externalities related to 
unconventional energy extraction, such as air, water, and noise pollution, amongst other 
things, the states of New York and Vermont have placed moratoria on the practice. In the 
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November 2014 elections, there were eight ballot measures banning the practice in Ohio, 
Texas, and California 33 (Kraus, 2014). Unobserved time-variant county characteristics, 
such as social attitudes, could potentially affect local teenagers’ schooling decisions. 
Third and similarly, oil and gas companies may target oil and gas formations in counties 
based on characteristics not observed by researchers and that affect the outcome of 
interest.  
One observed characteristic, the schooling level, draws concerns of reverse causality. 
The local education distribution determines the relative wages of different skill groups, 
and relative wages may affect drilling location decisions. An oil or gas company may 
wish to drill in a low-skill location or in a location where skills are declining over time. If 
well drilling lowers education, and low schooling levels also attract drilling, the point 
estimation 𝛽𝛽1� will be biased in an ambiguous direction. In my panel setting, bias occurs if 
deviations in de-trended high school enrollment or graduation affect (i.e. after accounting 
for county and year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends) affect past, present or 
future drilling location decisions.  
To deal with omitted variable bias and reverse causality, I require an instrument for 
𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 in equation (2). I rely on the geographic variation of shale 
formations and calculate the percentage of area of a county that is over a shale formation. 
I further multiply it with the world energy price index to obtain the instrument in my 
panel.  Two conditions are required for the instrumental variable strategy to be valid. 
First, shale play beneath counties and world energy price must have a significant effect 
                                                          
 
33 Four of these eight were passed, including in Denton, Texas; San Benito County, California; Mendocino 
County, California; and Athens, Ohio. 
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on drilling activities. Second, the instrument should be exogenous to the error term in 
equation (2). That is, the instrument variable can only affect deviations in schooling – 
those not accounted for by the county fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-specific time 
trends and additional controls – through oil and gas drilling.  
The first condition holds both intuitively and statistically. The recent energy boom is 
driven by shale gas extraction. The shale formation, combined with world energy price 
index, correlates strongly with 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 . The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for 
the first stage in the IV modeling is well above a rule of thumb of 10 for one endogenous 
regressor and one instrument suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), as well as the 16.38 
level suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). I further argue the second exclusion 
restriction is plausibly satisfied. First, the shale formation as an initial geological 
endowment is outside of human control. Further, since shale formations are subsurface 
geologic formations, it is unlikely to have an impact on local economic conditions, let 
alone teenagers’ schooling decisions, except through oil and gas extraction. Second, the 
world energy price index, the other component of my instrument, is typically driven by 
external demand or supply shocks, instead of changes in local labor or schooling 
distributions. With state-by-year fixed effects control for the general shocks and trends, 
the world energy price index is plausibly exogenous to local time-varying unobservables. 
Similar strategies have been successfully implemented by Weber (2012), Papyrakis and 
Raveh (2014) and Maniloff and Mastromonaco (2015) in the energy resource 
development context.  
The third econometric concern is measurement error in the schooling measures 𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖. 
The CCD enrollment data does not distinguish migrant students. In areas with a tight 
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local labor market, the energy boom is more likely to attract immigrants filling in the 
labor demand. Households might move into a booming area with teenage children who 
transfer into local schools. In this case, the enrollment or diploma counts would over-
measure the local schooling in booming areas. In addition, marginal teenagers in other 
areas could drop out and migrate into a booming area for work. Consequently, the point 
estimation on the drilling-schooling relation could be biased upwards and the results 
underestimate the true schooling decline. Thus, if a bias related to measurement error 
existed, it would strengthen the results rather than weaken them.  
Finally, I cluster all standard errors at the county level to prevent misleading inference 
due to serial correlation in the error term across years within a county (Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan 2004). A large number of groups (1170 counties) mitigates concerns 
regarding spurious correlation.   
4.5. Basic Results and Discussion 
4.5.1. Does the Energy Boom Affect the Local Labor Market or School 
Resources?  
First, I investigate the effects of drilling activities on the local labor market and school 
with the instrumental variable strategy. While my data set does not allow  me to identify 
the skill-specific labor demand, analysis using a total number of jobs and average 
earnings per job by the county as outcome variables shows significant positive effects 
from drilling density (column (1) and (2) in Table 3-2). This suggests the labor market 
channel is important in the energy boom and schooling relation.  
    I regress drilling activities on various school resources measures at the county level in 
my sample. Results show that a higher drilling density is related to the higher share of 
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school revenue from local, but shows no significant effects on per student total school 
revenue from all local, state and federal sources, as well as per student expenditure 
(column (3) to (5) in Table 3-2). On average, no increase in school resources is found in 
my sample. Thus, the school resource is less likely to be the mechanism to explain the 
energy boom and schooling relation. In summary, I hypothesize that schooling 
persistence decreases during energy boom in booming regions. 
4.5.2. The Effect of the Energy Boom on Schooling 
Table 3-3 presents the results from running the regression specification in equation (2). 
The outcome variable is the natural logarithm of grade 11 and 12 enrollment count. 
Column 1 compares drilling counties to zero-drilling counties in a given year with the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator. In column 2, I replace the categorical measure of 
drilling activities with the Drilling Density measurement with the OLS estimator. Column 
3 contains the panel fixed effect (FE) results, which include county and state-by-year 
fixed effects. Column 4 contains the instrumental variable (IV) results, in which I 
instrument the Drilling Density measure with the product of the proportion of county 
covering a shale play and the world energy price index. Finally, observed control 
variables are added onto the IV specification, and the results are shown in column 5. In 
both IV results, the first stage Kleibergen-Paap F statistics are well above the threshold 
value at 10, rejecting the weak instrument null hypothesis.  
Various estimators consistently show evidence of a negative energy boom and 
schooling relation.  Both pooled OLS and FE estimates will be biased if drilling density is 
correlated with unobserved determinants of high school enrollment. General economic 
shocks, such as the 2008 great recession, could depress both high school enrollment and 
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drilling activities at the same time. Fixed county characteristics related to geography, 
such as hilly areas, might also affect schooling and drilling activities in the same 
direction. Omitting these year and county fixed effects will bias the estimates upwards, 
leading to overestimation in pooled OLS results. Once the county, year fixed effects, and 
state-specific linear time trend are included in FE specifications, the coefficients of 
drilling density become much smaller and not statistically different from zero. Time-
varying unobservables could bias FE estimates. As discussed in detail in section 4.5.2, I 
apply an instrumental variable strategy to address the omitted variable bias and potential 
reverse causality concern.   
The IV estimations show evidence that drilling density decreases grade 11 and 12 
enrollment. The magnitude of the coefficient implies substantial educational impacts.  On 
average, with one additional oil/gas well drilled per initial 1,000 laborers, grade 11 and 
12 enrollment would decrease 0.24% at the county level, all else equal. As a concrete 
example, the 90th percentile of the distribution of annual drilling densities corresponds to 
10.43 oil/gas wells drilled per 1,000 initial laborers. Based on the IV point estimations in 
column 5 table 3, such a shock results in a 2.5% decrease in grade 11 and 12 enrollment 
on average. Alternatively, for every four oil/gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers, 
one student out of a hundred that could have enrolled would not enroll in high school on 
average.  
4.5.3. A Placebo Test and Robustness 
Evidence has shown the negative effect of a local energy boom on grade 11 and 12 
enrollment on average. In the United States, the ending age of compulsory school 
attendance law varies from 16 to 18 across states. Given that the compulsory school 
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regulation is implemented strictly, I should not expect that the energy boom has a 
significant effect on younger teens in any grade lower than grade 11. I take advantage of 
the compulsory school regulation and conduct a placebo test of the boom-schooling 
relation on grade 8 to 10 enrollments. 
Table 3-4 shows results of the placebo test among different grades. The energy boom, 
indicated with the drilling density measure, shows no significant effect on grade 8 to 10 
enrollments (column (1) to (3) in Table 3-4). The main response groups are grades 11 and 
12, when the youths are mostly between 16 and 18 years old and could legally leave 
school in certain states. The placebo test further validates the identification strategy.  
In addition, alternative schooling and drilling measures are employed to check the 
robustness of the main finding. The grade 9 to 12 enrollment rate, calculated by dividing 
the grade 9 to 12 enrollment counts with the county population of age 15 to 19, is 
employed as an alternative schooling measure. An alternative drilling density measure 
observes the number of new oil/gas well drilled per square mile. To address concerns 
with some extreme outliers in the drilling data, I further follow Maniloff and 
Mastromonaco (2014) and Cascio and Narayan (2015) in also taking the inverse 
hyperbolic sine (IHS) of the drilling density measures. The IHS effectively allows me to 
take the natural logarithm of the drilling measures but retain observations with zero wells 
drilled in the estimation sample34. In summary, there is a negative impact of drilling 
activities on the grade 9 to 12 enrollment rate (Appendix Table A 3-2).  
                                                          
 
34 The inverse hyperbolic sine of x is sinh−1 𝑥𝑥 = ln (𝑥𝑥 + √𝑥𝑥2 + 1). It is a convenient choice for a nonlinear 
specification because it is defined at zero and for a large portion of the real line, its derivative is equivalent 
to the derivative of the natural logarithm. Accordingly, I can interpret coefficient estimates as elasticities 
when the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of an outcome variable. (Maniloff and Mastromonaco 
2015) 
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Further, studies have adopted the Difference-in-Difference (DID) model to investigate 
local impacts of the recent energy boom (Weber 2012 and 2013, Manifloff and 
Mastromonaco 2014, Cascio and Narayan 2015). However, given the panel nature of my 
enrollment and drilling density data, a clear experimental design can rarely be 
constructed without ad hoc cut-offs on treatments. For example, one could use a specific 
year to indicate the start of the boom despite the considerable variation in the timing of 
the boom across areas. Therefore, I employed the panel model in the basic analysis. 
Nonetheless, I further check the robustness of the results with a boom spell analysis. The 
results confirm the negative boom-schooling relation (Appendix A 3.3).   
4.6. Heterogeneous Effects  
In the previous sections, I argued that a local energy boom could alter the opportunity 
cost of schooling; and that I identified the effect on schooling by comparing grade 11 and 
12 enrollments within and across counties experiencing diverse drilling densities. In this 
section, I further explore the heterogeneous effects with respect to the compulsory school 
regulations, taxation, county types and intensities of the energy boom.  
4.6.1. Heterogeneous Effects by Compulsory Schooling Regulations 
Across states in the U.S., the ending age of compulsory school attendance law varies 
from 16 to 18. Table 5 summaries age ranges for compulsory schooling in 15 sample 
states in the year 2000 and 2010. In 2000, 7 out of 15 sample states set the ending age at 
16. By 2010, 4 states have lifted the ending age of compulsory schooling to 17 or 18 
years old. If compulsory schooling laws constrained schooling choices, I would expect 
the negative effect of drilling activities on schooling to be larger in states with lower age 
requirements, e.g. the ending age at 16 years old.  
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    Utilizing variations in compulsory schooling regulations in my sample, I interact the 
drilling density measure with compulsory schooling age dummies in the IV specification 
to investigate heterogeneous effects.  The result is shown in column (1) Table 3-6. In 
states where a 16-years-old compulsory schooling age is enforced, one more oil/gas well 
drilled per initial 1,000 labors decreases grade 11 and 12 enrollment by 0.60%. That is, 
for every two oil/gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers, one student out of a hundred 
that could have enrolled would not enroll in high school on average. While in states with 
a 17- or 18-years-old age regulation, the negative effect significantly drops to 0.19%, 
which is less than one-third of 0.60%. In other words, when experiencing the same level 
of drilling activities locally, 16 to 18 years old teenagers facing a 16-years-old 
compulsory schooling law are three times more likely to not enroll in school, than those 
constrained by a 17- or 18-years-old age regulation. Literature has well documented that 
longer years of schooling increase individual’s lifetime earnings (e.g. Angrist and 
Krueger 1991, Acemoglu and Angrist 2001), as well as promote economic development 
(e.g. Lucas 1988, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). The findings call for a rise in ending 
ages of the compulsory schooling law to mediate the negative schooling effect in energy 
booming areas.  
4.6.2. Heterogeneous Effects by Taxations on Oil and Gas Production 
The basic results discussed in section 4.5 suggest the local labor market channel 
dominates the negative energy boom and schooling relation. In this subsection, I ask 
whether state and local taxation on oil and gas productions could meditate the negative 
effect. The school resource channel supports a yes answer. A favorable school financial 
status allows schools to purchase better equipment and pay higher salaries, which 
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promote student retention. According to the U.S. Department of Education, federal, state, 
and local sources of public school revenue account for 8%, 46%, and 46% of total 
revenues respectively in 2012-2013 school year, and 81% of local revenues for public 
and elementary secondary school districts were derived from local property taxes (Digest 
of Education Statistics 2016).  
    Revenue windfalls from an energy boom could channel into school revenues through 
state taxation on oil and gas production and local sources, e.g. property taxes on oil and 
gas wells. Names of the resource taxes and the workings vary considerably across states 
in the U.S. Utilizing the state average effective tax rates on oil and gas production 
estimated by Weber, Wang and Chomas (2016), I am able to investigate the 
heterogeneous effect driven by state tax variations. The effective tax rate estimations 
exclude property taxes since they are set and collected by local governments rather than 
state government. I further identify states that allow local government to levy property 
taxes on oil and gas wells in my sample. Table 3-7 summarizes this information.  Sorted 
by the average effective tax rates from lowest to highest in 15 sample states, the 
comparison suggests the substitution between the tax rates and local property tax policy – 
for states tax oil and gas production less at the state level, property taxes are usually 
levied on oil and gas wells from local governments.  
    I hypothesize that state or local taxation on oil and gas productions could mediate the 
negative boom and schooling effect. I test them by interacting the drilling density with 
the state average effective tax rates on oil and gas production from Weber, Wang and 
Chomas (2016), and local property tax dummies respectively. Column (2) and (3) in 
Table 3-6 show the results. The positive and significant coefficient on the interaction 
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term suggests that higher state taxes on oil and gas production mediates the negative 
boom and schooling relation (column (2) Table 3-6). No evidence suggests the local 
property tax policy makes the difference (column (3) Table 3-6).  
4.6.3. Heterogeneous Effects by County Type 
The similar density of drilling activities could be perceived differently across counties. 
The boom-schooling relation can vary with county characteristics. I explore the 
heterogeneous effects of county types in three aspects: mining counties, metro-nonmetro-
rural distinction, and persistent poverty counties. 
The significance of the mining industry in a local economy could alter youth’s 
perception about the energy boom. In a mining town, the earnings and employment 
related to the energy sector are sizable and stable. Local residents are generally familiar 
with the industry and likely to hold a general acceptance towards it. When an energy 
boom takes place with increasing labor demand and wages, teenagers are more likely to 
see the boom as an opportunity for a long-term job option, thus are more likely to choose 
to work. Therefore, I would expect a larger negative effect on schooling in traditional 
mining towns. I test this hypothesis by introducing an interaction term, DrillingDensity× 
MineCounty, into the basic model in equation (2).  MineCounty is a dummy variable and 
identifies a mining county if the mining industry accounts for an annual average of 15 
percent or more of total county earnings during 1998-2000, according to the USDA ERS 
County Typology 2004 edition. 92 counties are identified as mining counties in my 
sample. The results are shown in columns (4) in Table 3-6. As expected, on average, one 
additional oil or gas well drilling per initial 1,000 laborers is associated with a significant 
0.48% decline in grade 11 and 12 enrollment in mining counties, compared to a 
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significant 0.20% decline in all other counties. The negative boom-schooling relation is 
doubled in mining counties.    
The metro-nonmetro-rural distinction could alter the boom-schooling relation in two 
ways. On the one hand, a sparsely populated non-metro area implies a tight local labor 
market. Compared with the sufficient labor supply in the metro area, wages are more 
likely to be forced up in less populated non-metro areas with an energy boom. Therefore, 
the opportunity cost of staying in school could be higher for teens in non-metro or rural 
areas. On the other hand, along with the mining county argument earlier, with a generally 
more diverse industry mix in a metro area, a similar size energy boom will be more 
visible in non-metro and rural areas and thus more likely to be perceived by local teens. 
As a result, teenagers are more likely to response to an energy boom by working and not 
enrolling in school.  
To test this hypothesis, I employ the USDA Rural-Urban Continuum Codes in 1993 
and divide my sample counties into 3 exclusive groups: metro counties where a county is 
in or adjacent to a metro area with more than 250,000 population; nonmetro counties 
where counties have more than 2,500 urban population and are not metro counties; and 
completely rural counties with less than 2,500 urban population. In my sample counties, 
there are 298 metro counties, 578 non-metro counties, and 293 completely rural counties. 
Leaving out metro counties as the comparison group, NonmetroCounty and RuralCounty 
dummies are introduced as interactions with DrillingDensity respectively. The results are 
shown in columns (5) in table 6. The significant and negative estimates on two 
interactions confirm the hypothesis that grade 11 and 12 enrollment are more likely to be 
negatively affected by the drilling activities in non-metro and rural areas. Evidence 
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suggests that the largest effect takes place in non-metro counties: with one additional oil 
or gas well drilling per initial 1,000 laborers, on average the grade 11 and 12 enrollment 
significantly declines 1.38% in non-metro counties and decreases 0.98% in completely 
rural counties. 
Finally, the energy boom may hit persistent poverty counties differently. The boom 
boosts income, which could loosen the budget constraint for households in poverty and 
therefore encourage education investment. However, the emerging job opportunities and 
raised wages could be more attractive in persistent poverty counties. The overall effect is 
thus ambiguous. With similar methodology, I introduce an interaction term, Drilling 
Density×PovertyCounty, into the basic model. PovertyCounty is a dummy variable to 
identify 172 persistent poverty counties in the sample, where 20 percent or more of 
county residents were poor, measured by the 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses. 
Shown in column (6) in Table 3-6, the results suggest a significant 0.32% larger negative 
effect on grade 11 and 12 enrollment in persistent poverty counties than others counties.  
4.6.4. The Heterogeneous Effect of Drilling Density  
The panel model in the basic analysis yields the average marginal effects of drilling 
density on high school enrollment across the sample. Given the considerable variation in 
drilling across sample counties, the effects on high school enrollment could vary 
depending on how intense the drilling is in a county. This implies a nonlinear boom-
schooling relation and a threshold effect: no effect may take place until drilling intensity 
reaches a certain level. For example, when investigating the employment effect of shale 
gas development in extraction counties in Pennsylvania, Wrenn, Kelsey and Jaenicke 
(2015) found that only high well activity (90 or more wells) impact employment 
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significantly. Given a threshold of drilling activities to boost local employment, I would 
expect even higher drilling activities to alter teenager’s behavior.  
    To explore this effect, I follow Wrenn, Kelsey and Jaenicke (2015) and group annual 
drilling density in various ways. Then I replace the continuous drilling density measure 
with different group dummies to detect the threshold effect. The results are shown in 
Table 3-8. In column (1), I specify a binary variable that is 1 for counties have any 
drilling activity in a given year and zero otherwise. In column (2), I assign levels of 
drilling activities to three discrete bins: drilling density is between 1 to 10 oil or gas wells 
drilled per initial 1,000 laborers in a given year (Drill 1-10), then between 10 to 100 oil or 
gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers in a given year (Drill 10 -100), and more than 
100 oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers in a given year (Drill 100 +). In 
column (3), I further divide the Drill 100 + group into Drill 100 -200 (100 ≤ drill density 
< 200) and Drill 200 + (drill density ≥ 200). The coefficients represent percent changes 
for the effects relative to the baseline enrollment trend in counties when no drilling 
activity took place. When the drilling density is less than 100 wells per initial 1,000 
laborers, the impact of drilling activities on grade 11 and 12 enrollment is not significant. 
Evidence show significant negative relations when the drilling density is more than 100, 
implying a threshold effect. The threshold effects or the nonlinear relation can be 
explored further with nonparametric models in further research.  
4.7. Conclusions 
Energy booms can discourage investments in education by increasing the opportunity 
cost for students to stay in school, especially for students who highly discount the future. 
This paper finds that for the 15 oil and gas production states in the U.S. during the period 
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2000 to 2013, the intensive drilling activities altered enrollment decisions of teenagers. 
The magnitudes I find suggest that for every four oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 
laborers, one student out of a hundred that could have enrolled would not enroll in grade 
11 and 12 on average. More specifically, given that the drilling density is 7.58, and that 
total count of grade 11 and 12 enrolled students is 1,962 in an average county during a 
year, about 36 fewer students per county (0.24% × 7.58 × 1,962) and overall 41,760 
fewer students across the 15 states enrolled in grade 11 and 12 with the energy boom.  
While recent oil and gas development across the U.S. benefits the economy with jobs 
and may set the U.S. on a path toward energy independence, this study points to another 
potential negative side effect on schooling besides environmental concerns. The decision 
of not enrolling in school but rather working could well be a rational one in the face of 
relatively high wages. Those students who drop out may re-enroll later in their lives 
(Emery, Ferrer and Green 2012) thus mediating the overall effect on human capital 
accumulation. Nonetheless, teenagers who overweight the present could give up 
education earlier than they should have. 
Given the trade-off in recent oil and gas development, it is beneficial to recognize and 
identify the heterogeneous effects of the benefits and costs related to the energy boom. 
This study shows that the negative boom-schooling relation is larger in states with a 16-
years-old compulsory schooling age regulation, lower state effective tax rate on oil and 
gas productions, traditional mining, non-metro, and persistent poverty counties. Also, 
drilling activities may not significantly impact local schooling until they reach a certain 
intensity. Future research can focus on the heterogeneity across regions to better facilitate 
local policy making.  
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Along the lines of Atkin (2016), some policy remedies can mitigate the negative 
schooling impact of the energy boom by lowering the opportunity cost of schooling while 
welcoming the local economic boom at the same time.  For example, an increase in the 
ending age of compulsory attendance in some states, payments to households conditioned 
on children’s school attendance, and finally, opportunities and reduced costs of returning 
to school or other further education that allows dropouts to obtain the foregone education 
in times of energy bust.   
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4.8. Tables in Chapter 4 
Table 4-1 Summary Statistics 
 
Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Outcome Variables      
Grade 11 and 12 Enrollment Counts 16,179 1,962.08 5,201.08 3 101,966 
Grade 8 Enrollment Counts 16,256 1,109.31 3,123.08 1 71,481 
Grade 9 Enrollment Counts 16,190 1,241.33 3,708.60 1 101,687 
Grade 10 Enrollment Counts 16,185 1,119.16 3,172.83 1 85,923 
Grade 11 Enrollment Counts 16,183 1,010.95 2,708.02 1 53,115 
Grade 12 Enrollment Counts 16,181 951.53 2,496.53 1 48,851 
Key Explanatory Variable      
Newly Drilled Oil and Gas Well Counts 
(#) 16,380 30.55 96.41 0 2708 
Well Spud per 1,000 labors in 2000 16,380 7.58 63.58 0 3857.14 
Well Spud per Square Mile 16,380 0.03 0.08 0 1.21 
Share of County Area Covered by a 
Shale   Play  [0,1] 1,170 0.34 0.43 0 1.00 
Controls – Schooling Conditions      
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 16,167 0.14 0.03 0.01 2.03 
Total School Revenue per Students 
($1,000/student) 15,108 11.78 6.70 0.56 172.92 
Total School Expenditure per Students 
($1,000/student) 15,108 11.71 6.70 0.28 148.50 
Share of School Revenue from Local 
[0,1] 15,129 0.39 0.17 0.07 1.00 
Controls – Economic Conditions       
Median Household Income ($10,000) 16,380 3.93 1.03 0 10.52 
Income per Capita ($10,000) 16,378 2.99 0.97 1.02 18.96 
Poverty Rate  [0,1] 16,380 0.16 0.06 0 0.53 
Youth Poverty Rate  [0,1] 16,380 0.23 0.09 0 0.70 
Total Count Number of Jobs (#) 
16,378 504.19 1,651.68 0.60 
29,612.0
8 
Unemployment rate  [0,1] 16,380 0.06 0.03 0 0.24 
Earn per Job ($10,000) 16,378 3.42 0.99 0.70 11.94 
Controls – Demographics       
Population per Square Mile (1,000 
persons /sq. mi.) 16,380 0.18 1.28 0 71.49 
Population between Age 15 and 19 (#) 
16,377 6,332.76 
17,099.0
4 1 301,079 
Share of African American [0,1] 16,377 0.06 0.10 0 0.69 
Share of Hispanic [0,1] 16,377 0.10 0.16 0 0.98 
Share of population above age 65 [0,1] 16,377 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.37 
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Table 4-2 (continued) 
The number of Violent Crimes per 
Person 15,454 0.002 0.002 0 0.031 
The number of Property Crimes per 
Person 15,464 0.016 0.014 0 0.241 
Notes: units are in ( ) and ranges are in [ ]; outcome variable and schooling condition 
control variable data are obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES); oil and gas well records are requested from state agencies such as Department of 
Natural Resource, Department of Environment Protect/Commission, Industrial 
Commission, and Geological Survey. Other data of control variables are from the Census 
Bureau’s U.S. Counties database.    
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Table 4-3 The Effects of Drilling Activities on Local Labor Market and School 
Resources 
 
Total 
Number of 
Jobs (log) 
Earn per 
Job (log) 
Share of 
School 
Revenue 
from Local 
Total 
School 
Revenue 
per Student 
(log) 
Total 
School 
Expenditure 
per Student 
(log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Drilling 
Density 
0.0011*** 0.0016*** 0.0006* -0.0001 -0.0013 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
      
Dependent 
Variable 
Means (in 
levels) 
504 34,200 0.39 11,780 11,710 
Observations 14193 14193 14393 14372 14372 
R2 0.418 0.766 0.127 0.661 0.550 
Kleibergen-
Paap F-stat 
(1st Stage) 
31.591 31.591 36.811 37.221 37.221 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: the point estimates of coefficients on Drilling Density - the number of new oil and 
gas well drilled per initial 1,000 labors in 2000 – are summarized. All models instrument 
Drilling Density measures with the product of the proportion of county covering a shale 
play and the world energy price index. Controls in column (1) and (2) include three sets 
of control variables: schooling conditions (e.g. pupil-teacher ratio, log of total revenue 
per student, log of total expenditure per student, percentage school revenue from local), 
economic conditions (e.g. log of median household income, log of income per capita, 
poverty rate), and demographic (e.g. population density, African-American population 
share, Hispanic population share, senior population share, and crime rate). Controls in 
column (3) to (6) include two sets of control variables: economic conditions and 
demographics. County clustered standard errors in parentheses. − * significant at 10 
percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table 4-4 The Effect of Drilling Activities on High School Grade 11 and 12 Enrollment, 
2000-2013 
 Grade 11 to 12 Enrollment Count (log)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS FE IV IV 
      
AnyDrill -0.1507
***     
(0.0225)     
      
DrillingDensity 
 
 -
0.0079*** 
-0.0001 -0.0026*** -0.0024*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
      
Observations 16179 16179 16179 16179 14103 
R2 0.003 0.036 0.164 0.102 0.127 
Kleibergen-Paap F-
stat (1st Stage) 
   43.692 34.628 
County FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-year FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls  No No No No Yes 
Notes: The mean enrollment of grade 11 to 12 in level is 1,962 students per county; 
AnyDrill =1 if counties have any oil or gas well drilled in a given year; Drilling Density 
is the number of new oil and gas well drilled per initial 1,000 labors in 2000. The IV 
columns instrument Drilling Density measures with the product of the proportion of 
county covering a shale play and the world energy price index. Controls includes three 
sets of control variables: school conditions (e.g. pupil-teacher ratio, log of total revenue 
per student, log of total expenditure per student, percentage school revenue from local), 
economic conditions (e.g. log of median household income, log of income per capita, 
poverty rate, log of job numbers, unemployment rate, log of earn per job), and 
demographic (e.g. population density, black population share, Hispanic population share, 
senior population share, and crime rate). County clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
−* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 
percent level. 
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Table 4-5 The Placebo Test among Grade 8 to 12 
Dependent 
Variables: 
Enrollment 
Counts (log) 
     
Grade 8 
(1) 
Grade 9 
(2) 
Grade 10 
(3) 
Grade 11 
(4) 
Grade 12 
(5) 
      
Drilling 
Density 
0.0013 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0025*** -0.0023** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
      
Dependent 
Variable 
Means 
(in level) 
1,109 1,241 1,119 1,011 952 
Observations 14,140 14,105 14,106 14,105 14,103 
R2 0.154 0.195 0.166 0.089 0.084 
Kleibergen-
Paap F-stat 
(1st Stage) 
35.665 34.472 34.611 34.629 34.630 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-
year FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: the point estimates of coefficients on Drilling Density - the number of new oil and 
gas well drilled per initial 1,000 labors in 2000 – are summarized in two panels. All 
models instrument Drilling Density measures by the product of the proportion of county 
covering a shale play and the world energy price index. County fixed effects, state-by-
year fixed effects, and controls are included in all models. County clustered standard 
errors in parentheses.−*significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, 
*** significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table 4-6 Age Ranges for Compulsory School in 15 Sample States, 2000 and 2010 
 2000 2010 Policy Changing Year 
Arkansas 1 5 to 17 5 to 17 --- 
Colorado --- 6 to 17 2007 
Kentucky 6 to 16 6 to 16 --- 
Louisiana 1 7 to 17 7 to 18 2006 
Michigan 6 to 16 6 to 18 2010 
Montana 1 7 to 16 7 to 16 --- 
New York 1,2 6 to 16 6 to 16 --- 
North Dakota 7 to 16 7 to 16 --- 
Ohio 6 to 18 6 to 18 --- 
Oklahoma 5 to 18 5 to 18 --- 
Pennsylvania 1 8 to 17 8 to 17 --- 
Texas 6 to 18 6 to 18 --- 
Utah 6 to 18 6 to 18 --- 
West Virginia 6 to 16 6 to 17 2010 
Wyoming 1 6 to 16 7 to 16 --- 
Notes: 1- Child may be exempted from compulsory attendance if he/she meets state 
requirements for early withdrawal with or without meeting conditions for a diploma or 
equivalency. 
2-New York City and Buffalo require school attendance until age 17 unless employed. 
Source: Council of Chief State School Officers, Key State Education Policies on PK–12 
Education, 2000; Education Commission of the States (ECS), ECS StateNotes, 
Compulsory School Age Requirements, retrieved August 9, 2010, from 
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/86/62/8662.pdf. 
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Table 4-7 Heterogeneous Effects among Counties 
 Grade 11 – 12 Enrollment Count  (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DrillingDensity 
 
-0.0019** -0.0121*** -0.0031 -0.0020** 0.0091 -0.0019** 
(0.0010) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0056) (0.0008) 
DrillingDensity × 
CompulsoryAge16 
-0.0041*      
 (0.0024)      
DrillingDensity × 
CompulsoryAge17 
0.0028      
 (0.0038)      
DrillingDensity × 
AveEffectiveTaxRates 
 
 0.0023***     
 (0.0005)     
DrillingDensity × 
LocalPropertyTax 
  0.0008    
  (0.0020)    
DrillingDensity × 
MineCounty 
 
   -0.0028***   
   (0.0010)   
DrillingDensity × 
NonMetroCounty 
    -0.0138***  
    (0.0052)  
DrillingDensity × 
RuralCounty 
 
    -0.0098*  
    (0.0054)  
DrillingDensity × 
PovertyCounty 
     -0.0032** 
     (0.0015) 
Observations 13853 13426 14103 14103 14103 14103 
 R2 0.122 0.035 0.145 0.106 0.087 0.163 
Kleibergen-Paap F-
stat (1st Stage) 
12.814 15.512 10.483 16.356 14.309 14.620 
Notes: Drilling Density is the number of new oil and gas well drilled per initial 1,000 labors in 
2000. Interactions of Drilling Density and different state/county typologies are introduced into 
the basic model. Data of average effective tax rates by state are from Weber et al. (2016) Table 
A4. CompulsoryAge16=1 if the ending compulsory school age is 16 in a given year; similarly 
applies to CompulsoryAge17. LocalPropertyTax=1 if states allow local government to levy ad-
valorem property taxes on oil and gas property. Based on USDA ERS County Typology 2004 
edition, MiningCounty=1 if the mining industry is accounting for an annual average of 15 percent 
or more of total county earnings during 1998-2000. PovertyCounty=1 for persistent poverty 
counties, where 20 percent or more of county residents were poor, measured by the 1970, 1980, 
1990 and 2000 censuses. Based on USDA Rural-Urban Continuum Codes in 2003, 
NonmetroCounty=1 if counties with more than 2,500 urban population and not in or adjacent to 
metro areas; RuralCounty=1 if counties with less than 2,500 urban population. All models 
instrument Drilling Density measures with the product of the proportion of county covering a 
shale play and the world energy price index. County and state by year fixed effects are included. 
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.  −* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant 
at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level.  
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Table 4-8 Taxation on Energy Windfalls 
State 
Average Effective Tax 
Rates on Oil and Gas 
Production 
(%, state tax only, 
2004-2013)1 
Whether Levy 
Local Property 
Taxes on Wells2 
Share of School 
Revenue from 
Local (%, average 
across counties, 
2000-2013)3 
Ohio 0.3 Yes 42.8 
Arkansas 0.9 Yes 29.1 
Pennsylvania 1.2 No 52.0 
Colorado 1.7 Yes 50.5 
Utah 2.0 Yes 33.4 
Texas 4.1 Yes 48.1 
West Virginia 4.2 Yes 27.2 
Wyoming 4.4 Yes 43.4 
Kentucky 4.7 Yes 22.9 
Michigan 4.8 No 36.3 
Louisiana 5.3 No 34.1 
Oklahoma 6.2 No 31.2 
North Dakota 8.1 No 48.9 
Montana 8.6 No 39.8 
New York ---- No 41.0 
Note: 1-Data cited from Weber, Wang, and Chomas (2016) table A4. 
2- Information from Independent Fiscal Office (IFO) of Pennsylvania (2014) and Newell 
and Raimi (2015) 
3- Data downloaded from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)  
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Table 4-9 Threshold Effects of Drilling Density 
 Grade 11 – 12 Enrollment Count  (log) 
Drilling Density 
Dummies 
(1) (2) (3) 
AnyDrill -0.0023   
 (0.0054)   
Drill 1-10  -0.0021 -0.0021 
  (0.0054) (0.0054) 
Drill 10-100  -0.0074 -0.0073 
  (0.0095) (0.0095) 
Drill 100+  -0.0925**  
  (0.0433)  
Drill 100-200   -0.0981* 
   (0.0511) 
Drill 200+   -0.0765* 
   (0.0448) 
Observation 6680 6680 6680 
R2 0.356 0.359 0.359 
County FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Drilling Density is replaced with group dummies in the basic model. AnyDrill =1 if 
counties have any oil or gas well drilled in a given year; Drill 1-10 =1 if counties have 
more than zero but less than 10 oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 labor in a given 
year; Drill 10 -100 =1 if counties have more than 10 but less than 100 oil or gas wells 
drilled per initial 1,000 labor in a given year; Drill 100 + =1 if counties have more than 
100 oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 labor in a given year; Drill 100 -200 =1 if 
counties have more than 100 but less than 200 oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 
labor in a given year; Drill 200 + =1 if counties have more than 200 oil or gas wells 
drilled per initial 1,000 labor in a given year. Fixed effect estimators are applied. County 
clustered standard errors in parentheses. −* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant 
at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level. 
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4.9. Figures in Chapter 4 
 
Figure 4-1 Time Trend of the Oil/Gas Well Drilling in 15 States in the U.S., 1900-2014 
Note: Author's calculations based on well records data from various state agencies 
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Figure 4-2 Fifteen States in the Sample and Proportion of Each County Contained above 
a Shale Play 
 Note: Author's calculations based on the U.S. shale play shapefile from EIA. 
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Figure 4-3 Average County Drilling Activities and Grade 11 to 12 Enrollment, 2000-
2013 
Note: Author's calculations based on well records data from various state agencies and 
schooling data from National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 
. 
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Panel A: 2000 
 
 
Panel B: 2013 
 
Figure 4-4 Drilling Densities across Sample Counties, 2000 vs. 2013 
Note: Author's calculations based on well records data from various state agencies.   
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
The dissertation research comprises three essays on the topic of the resource curse 
hypothesis and its mechanisms. The phenomenon of low economic growth in resource-
rich regions is recognized as the “resource curse”. These essays will contribute to an 
understanding of the regional resource-growth relation within a nation.  
    The resource curse hypothesis was tested within the highly developed United States. A 
system of equations model allows me to decompose the resource effect and account for 
the two mechanisms, crowding-out effects and institution effects, simultaneously in one 
setting. The results suggest that both effects contribute to the resource-growth relation, 
but also that the overall resource effect is positive or neutral.  The decomposition with the 
direct, crowding-out, and institution effects at a subnational level offers a better 
understanding of resource curse mechanisms. First, I found that the direct resource effect 
was positive or neutral once the crowding-out and institutional effects were isolated. 
Then, the evidence suggests that resource wealth crowds out industrial investment, thus 
hindering growth in the U.S. This result parallels the local Dutch Disease narrative that 
wealth generated by the sale of natural resources tends to crowd out the manufacturing 
sector. Finally, I focus on state and local government efficiency as a proxy for 
institutional outcomes and further employ ex-ante measures to minimize endogeneity 
concerns. The results confirm that institutions mediate the crowding-out effect and reject 
the resource curse hypothesis within the U.S. in the past two decades.  
The comparison between the two largest energy-producing nations in the world shed 
light on the resource – growth relation in distinct economic systems and institution 
arrangements. Using panel data from 1990 to 2015, I compared the effects of resource 
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revenues on the economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces 
and American states. To address the endogeneity issue of resource revenues with regional 
economic conditions, I employ the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy and instrument the 
resource revenue with a product of the resource reserves in 1990 and the national primary 
energy prices. Evidence suggests that resource revenues increase the regional growth in 
both China and the U.S. with a larger and more statistically significant effect shown 
across U.S. states. The booming resources, coal in China, oil and natural gas in the U.S., 
contribute to the positive resource – growth relation in the short term.  However, resource 
revenues show negative effects on growth-related factors, such as education attainments 
and R&D activities while pushing up the investment across regions. This cast concerns 
on the long-term economic growth in resource-rich regions.  
Further testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g. the market price 
reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show that the market 
price reform together with the privatization process on coal resources contribute the 
positive resource effect in China. The Western Development Strategy also show a 
positive effect on strength the resource – growth relation in western provinces. On the 
other hand, with all natural resources owned by the state and majority managed by the 
state-owned enterprises, the fiscal reform does not seem to matter in the resource – 
growth relation in the China case with the results. 
Investigating the human resource channel in particular, evidence suggests that the 
intensive drilling activities altered enrollment decisions of teenagers for the 15 oil and 
gas production states in the U.S. during the period 2000 to 2013. The magnitudes I find 
suggest that for every four oil or gas wells drilled per initial 1,000 laborers, one student 
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out of a hundred that could have enrolled would not enroll in grade 11 and 12 on average. 
More specifically, given that the drilling density is 7.58, and that total count of grade 11 
and 12 enrolled students is 1,962 in an average county during a year, about 36 fewer 
students per county and overall 41,760 fewer students across the 15 states enrolled in 
grade 11 and 12 with the energy boom. that the negative boom-schooling relation is 
larger in states with a 16-years-old compulsory schooling age regulation, lower state 
effective tax rate on oil and gas productions, traditional mining, non-metro, and persistent 
poverty counties. Policies remedies can mitigate the negative schooling impact of the 
energy boom by lowering the opportunity cost of schooling while welcoming the local 
economic boom at the same time.  For example, an increase in the ending age of 
compulsory attendance in some states.  
In an overview of the resource curse literature, Frederick van der Ploeg (2011) stated 
that a key question remained “why some resource-rich economies [.] are more successful 
while others perform badly despite their immense natural wealth”(page 366). This 
dissertation contributes pieces of evidence that resource promotes regional economy 
better with more effective local governments (e.g. across the U.S. states) and more 
efficient market system (e.g. the China case). Furthermore, resource developments tend 
to mediate human capital accumulation, thus cast concern on the economic growth in the 
long run.    
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Appendices  
A 1.1 the Government Efficiency Index Measure 
Following Borge, Falch, and Tovmo (2008), Borge, Parmer, and Torvik (2013) and 
Andrews and Brewer (2013), the efficiency is measured as the ratio between total output 
and available resource. The output is a weighted Z-scores summation of five main public 
service sectors (s): Education, Health, Highways, Public Safety, and Environment, which 
account for about 89% of the state and local government direct general expenditures in 
2010. All sectors are weighted by their expenditure share (𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔). The measure relies on a 
total 15 indicators (𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) of production from the different service sectors (see table A1). 
Indicators are equally weighted within each sector (𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗). The calculation of the aggregate 
output measure is as follows:  
(1) 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  ∑ [𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔(∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑍𝑍𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐽𝐽𝑠𝑠
𝑗𝑗=1 ) ]
5
𝑔𝑔=1 ,  
  where 𝑍𝑍𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
(𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 −𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝚤𝚤����)
�1
𝑁𝑁
∑ �𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 −𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝚤𝚤�����
2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
; ∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔=1 = 1; ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝑔𝑔
𝑗𝑗=1 = 1;  
Here, 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is indicator j in sector s of state and local governments at state i at time t, 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝚤𝚤���� is 
the sample mean for each indicator j across 50 states.  p and q are, respectively, sector 
and indicator weights. N is the sample size of 50 states.  
    To obtain the efficiency measure, I divide the output by real per capita revenue of state 
and local governments (𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) for each state i at time t (equation 6). State and 
local government revenue data are collected from the Census of Government Finances 
and Annual Survey of Local Government Finances, which sums intergovernmental 
revenue, total taxes, charges and miscellaneous general revenue, utility revenue, liquor 
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store revenue and insurance trust revenue. The revenues are deflated by annual Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  
𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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A 1.2 Indicators, weights and sources in the aggregated output measure 
Sectors 
Sector 
weights 
(𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔) Indicators (𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖 )1 Source 
Education 0.40 
Test score on K12 (Ratio at or 
above basic):  
NAEP 4th reading; NAEP 4th math; 
NAEP 8th reading; NAEP 8th math 
National Center for 
Education Statistics 
Test score on college entrance:  
SAT mean score; ACT mean score 
Annual SAT Report on 
College & Career Readiness, 
The College Board; ACT 
website  
Teens ages 16 to 19, not in school 
and not high school graduates 
the KIDS COUNT Data 
Center, the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation High School Graduation 
Health 0.29 
Infant deaths per 1,000 births 
National Vital Statistics 
System, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services 
Limited activity days per 30 days: 
poor physical health days; poor 
mental health days America's Health Rankings2 
Publications, United Health 
Foundation 
Immunization coverage-children 
Infectious disease per 100,000 
population: Chlamydia, Pertussis, 
and Salmonella 
Highways 0.10 Percentage of highway bridges that are structurally sound 
Federal Highway 
Administration, U.S. 
Department of 
Transportation 
Public 
Safety 0.10 
Violent crime rate per 100,000 
population 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Property crimes rate per 100,000 population 
Parole violators among prison 
admissions 
Fire death rate per million 
(1,000,000) population U.S. Fire Administration 
Environment 0.10 
Air Pollution: Average exposure of 
the general public to particulate 
matter of 2.5 microns or less in size 
(PM2.5) 
EPA 
Count number of sites of brownfield 
grant 
EPA Brownfields Grant Fact 
Sheet 
Note: a. Some of the indicators were inverted to ensure that a higher score would reflect better performance 
(e.g. Teens ages 16 to 19 not in school and not high school graduates, most of the health indicators except 
Immunization coverage, and all public safety and environment indicators).  b. America’s Health Rankings 
is the longest running annual assessment of the U.S. health on a state-by-state basis. For detailed measures 
and sources, please refer to http://www.americashealthrankings.org/about/annual.   
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A 1.3 Description of variables used in the robustness checks 
Variable Definition Year available Source 
Governance     
Economic Freedom 
Index 
Annual Economic Freedom of North America Index, state and local 
government 
1981-2013 Fraser Institute 
Government size EFNA score of area 1: size of government (state and local )3 1981-2013 Fraser Institute 
Government 
employment  
State and local government employment as a percentage of total state 
employment 
1995-2014 Regional Economic Accounts, Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce 
Demographical and Social Characteristics   
Ethnic diversity Index =[1-∑(Race)2]*100, where Race denotes the share of population self-
identified as race (White, Black or African-American, American 
Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Some Other Race 
and Two or More races)4 
1995-2014 U.S. Census, Current Population 
Survey 
 
Population density People per square mile 1990-2014 U.S. Census, Current Population 
Survey 
Rent-seeking behavior    
Rent Seeking Density  The density per 10,000 persons for following establishment: legal 
services(5411), Management, Scientific and Technical Consulting 
Services (5416), Advertising, Public Relations, and Related Services 
(5418); Social Advocacy Organizations (8133), and Business, 
Professional, Labor, Political, and Similar Organizations (8139)1 
1997-2013 County Business Pattern 
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A 1.3 (continued) 
Campaign 
Contribution share 
from Energy sector 
The share of the contributions from energy and natural resource 
sector to selected offices candidates, such as gubernatorial, state 
house/assembly, state supreme court, state senate and other state- 
wide candidates. 
1994-2014 
Biennale 
National Institute on Money in State 
Politics2 
Variable Definition Year available Source 
Lobby Groups The data represent the totals of interest groups registered to lobby or 
that were represented by a registered lobbyist in the state for that 
year or legislative session per 10,000 persons. 
2006-2013 National Institute on Money in State 
Politics2 Lobbyists 2006-2013 
Alternative dependent variable    
Growth of GSP per 
capita 
Per capita real GDP by state, percent change from preceding period 1997-2014 Regional Economic Accounts, Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce 
Population Growth  Population percent change from preceding period by state 1997-2014 Population Estimates Program, 
Population Division, U.S. Census 
Bureau 
 
Note: a. The sector selected are based on Sobel and Garrett (2002) and the updated work by Hall and Ross (2010) table 2 “Traditional, In-Kind, 
and Indirect Rent Seeking industries”(page 12). 
          b. http://beta.followthemoney.org 
          c.  Part 1 of EFNA index is Size of Government, which includes 1A. General Consumption Expenditures by Government as a Percentage of 
GDP; 1B. Transfers and Subsidies as a Percentage of GDP; 1C: Social Security Payments as a Percentage of GDP. 
          d. Calculated by authors following Alesina et al. (1999) and Rupasingha et al. (2002). 
 
 
 
141 
 
A 1.4 Added Control Approach Robustness Checks 
  I. II. III. IV. VI. 
Specification Base +GOV +DEM +RS1 +RS2 
Base Ln(Inc) t-1 -10.70*** -8.25* -9.18* -5.64*** -34.59*** 
  (3.91) (4.73) (4.66) (1.83) (3.10) 
 Resource_point 0.06 0.30** 0.29** 0.60*** 0.28* 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) 
 Resource_point×  0.25** 0.53*** 0.50*** 0.60*** 0.58*** 
 Gov. Efficiency (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) 
 Investment (u) 0.48 0.41 0.34 0.95* -1.88*** 
  (0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.52) (0.31) 
 Human Capital(u)  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.083 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.20) 
 R&D(u) -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.24 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.21) (0.16) 
Governance Corruption  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02 
(GOV)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
 Eco. Freedom Index  0.516 0.01 0.86 -0.16 
   (0.81) (0.77) (0.96) (0.51) 
 Gov. Efficiency  0.18 0.33** 0.06 0.11 
   (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) 
 Gov. Size  -0.01 0.15 -0.54 0.11 
   (0.26) (0.26) (0.35) (0.44) 
 Gov. Emp. Share  0.79*** 0.69** 0.61* 0.56 
   (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.75) 
Demographics Ethnic Diversity Index   0.01 -0.05 -0.20*** 
(DEM)    (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
 Population Density   -0.04*** -0.02** -0.04*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rent Seeking Rent Seeking Density    -0.241 -0.81*** 
Behavior     (0.19) (0.26) 
(RS) Campaign Contribution    0.05 -0.16*** 
 from Energy Sector    (0.06) (0.06) 
 Lobby Groups     -0.03 
      (0.34) 
 Lobbyists     -0.07 
      (0.30) 
 Constant 112.1***   58.78*** 0 
  (41.39)   (20.30) (0) 
 No. Observations 798 699 699 3621 1741 
 Within R2 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.74 
Note: Fixed Effect models with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (in parentheses) are used to 
estimate; u indicates the residuals from equation (2); * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; The 
sample size drops dramatically due to missing values: The variable “Campaign Contribution from 
Energy Sector” covers the statewide general elections, which take places biannually depending on 
the states, so data on almost half of the years are missing. The National Institute on Money in 
State Politics started to report the data on lobby groups and lobbyists since 2006. 
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A 1.5 Robustness Check with the Reduced Form Eq. (3) 
 I. II. III. IV. VI. 
Growth FE FD Sys-
GMM 
SAC Dynamic 
SAC 
L1.Growth   -0.00  -0.03 
   (0.03)  (0.03) 
W.Growth    0.65*** 0.91*** 
    (0.10) (0.05) 
Ln(Inc) t-1 -10.70*** -85.72*** -24.27*** -9.40*** -7.02*** 
 (3.91) (4.99) (3.42) (2.23) (1.44) 
Resource_point 0.06 0.20 0.07** 0.11** 0.08** 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Resource_point×  0.25** 0.29* 0.42*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 
Gov. Efficiency (0.09) (0.17) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) 
Investment (u) 0.48 -0.29 -0.53 0.38 0.37 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.56) (0.33) (0.62) 
Human Capital(u)  0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
R&D(u) -0.02 -0.08 -0.22*** -0.04 -0.10 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) 
Constant 112.1*** 2.03*** 256.9*** 98.54*** 74.01*** 
 (41.39) (0.16) (35.88) (23.28) (15.12) 
No. Observations 798 746 798 768 720 
No. of states 50 50 50 48 48 
adj. R2 0.54 0.72  0.68 0.69 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Altonji-Elder-Taber 
Statistics 
1.50*** 
(0.34) 
1.94*** 
(0.26) 
   
 
      
System GMM post-estimation tests     
  AR(1) test   [0.00]   
  AR(2) test   [0.30]   
  Sargan over-identification test  [1.00]   
Spatial panel autocorrelation tests     
  LM SAC (LMErr+LMLag)   [0.00] [0.00]  
Note:” L1.Growth” is dependent variable with one period lag; “W.Growth” is spatial lagged dependent 
variable W is the row-standardized N×N rook contiguity-based binary matrix  in which each element is set 
to one if two states share a common border, and zero otherwise; u indicates the residuals from equation (2); 
Standard errors are in parentheses, Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are used in FE model; * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;p values are reported in square brackets; only 48 continental states are included in 
spatial analyses; the number of observations varies because of lagged variables.   
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A 1.6 Robustness Check with Different Dependent Variables 
  I. II. III. 
  Growth_Income Growth- GSPpc Growth_Pop. 
Investment Ln(Inc)t-1 0.31(0.26)   
 Ln(GSPpc) t-1  0.36*(0.22)  
 Ln(Pop) t-1   -0.17(0.32) 
 Resource_point -0.03***(0.01) -0.04***(0.01) -0.03***(0.01) 
 Constant -2.42(2.70) -2.98(2.25) 3.35(4.80) 
Human Ln(Inc)t-1 0.46(1.13)   
Capital Ln(GSPpc) t-1  2.27**(0.93)  
 Ln(Pop) t-1   -3.48***(1.34) 
 Resource_point 0.10***(0.04) 0.07*(0.04) 0.12***(0.04) 
 Constant 14.80(11.57) -3.95(9.65) 72.62***(20.51) 
R&D Ln(Inc)t-1 -1.06*(0.55)   
 Ln(GSPpc) t-1  -0.54(0.46)  
 Ln(Pop) t-1   0.84(0.66) 
 Resource_point 0.01(0.02) 0.01(0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
 Constant 12.58**(5.67) 7.24(4.75) -11.24(10.10) 
Growth Ln(Inc)t-1 -10.78***(2.04)   
 Ln(GSPpc) t-1  -10.34***(2.19)  
 Ln(Pop) t-1   -5.40***(0.66) 
 Resource_point 0.23***(0.08) 0.12(0.11) 0.18***(0.02) 
 Resource_point× 
Gov. Efficiency 
0.41***(0.07) 0.38***(0.09) 0.09***(0.02) 
 Investment 3.36***(0.75) 2.55***(0.96) 1.54***(0.21) 
 Human Capital 0.26*(0.15) 0.51**(0.20) 0.03(0.05) 
 R&D 1.52**(0.67) 2.45***(0.88) 0.27 (0.20) 
 Constant 102.7***(21.06) 95.06***(21.67) 81.05***(10.28) 
 No.Observations 747 747 747 
 State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Growth-income refers to annual growth rate in real per capita personal income, Growth-
GSPpc is the annual growth rate in real Gross State Production per capita, Growth-Pop is the 
annual growth rate in state population; 3SLS are applied to estimate; standard errors are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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A 3.1 Occupations and Educational Attainment in Mining Sector 
Panel A Largest Occupations in Sector 21 Mining and Requirements for Entry 
Occupation Employ-ment 
Share of total 
employment in 
mining sector 
Typical education needed for entry Work experience in a related occupation 
Roustabouts, Oil, and Gas 60,830 7.88% Less than high school None 
Service Unit Operators, Oil, Gas, and Mining 55,850 7.24% Less than high school None 
Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers 41,720 5.41% Postsecondary non-degree award None 
First-Line Supervisors of Construction Trades and 
Extraction Workers 
34,190 4.43% High school diploma or equivalent 5 years or more 
Operating Engineers and Other Construction 
Equipment Operators 
30,070 3.90% High school diploma or equivalent None 
Rotary Drill Operators, Oil, and Gas 23,590 3.06% Less than high school None 
Derrick Operators, Oil, and Gas 18,840 2.44% Less than high school None 
Helpers--Extraction Workers 18,600 2.41% High school diploma or equivalent None 
Panel B Educational attainment for workers 25 years and older by Largest Occupations in Sector 21 Mining 
Occupation Less than high school diploma (%) 
High school diploma or 
equivalent (%) 
More than High School  
(%) 
Roustabouts, Oil, and Gas 26.4 45.8 27.8 
Service Unit Operators, Oil, Gas, and Mining 26.4 45.8 27.8 
Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers 18.8 48.9 32.4 
First-Line Supervisors of Construction Trades and Extraction 
Workers 13.6 42.6 43.9 
Operating Engineers and Other Construction Equipment Operators 21.2 53.4 25.5 
Rotary Drill Operators, Oil, and Gas 26.4 45.8 27.8 
Derrick Operators, Oil, and Gas 26.4 45.8 27.8 
Helpers--Extraction Workers 22.4 50.9 26.6 
Sources: Occupational Employment Statistics and Employment Projections program, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistic  
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A3.2 the Robustness Check with Alternative Measures 
 Grade 9 to 12 Enrollment Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV 
DrillingDensity1 -0.0004 -0.0614*       
 (0.0035) (0.0359)       
         
IHS (DrillingDensity1)   -0.1199 -1.4139*     
   (0.1609) (0.7980)     
         
DrillingDensity2     -0.6145 -13.2738*   
     (1.3105) (7.5428)   
         
IHS (DrillingDensity2)       -0.6514 -13.9803* 
       (1.4347) (7.9353) 
Observations 14100 14100 14100 14100 14100 14100 14100 14100 
R2  0.121 0.005 0.121 0.030 0.121 0.031 0.121 0.031 
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (1st Stage)  33.992  144.379  104.960  113.914 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Drilling Density 1 is the number of new oil and gas well drilled per 1,000 labors in 2000. Drilling Density 2 is the number of 
new oil and gas well drilled per square mile. IHS(Drilling Density) is the inverse hyperbolic sine of  drilling density measures 
respectively. More specifically, the inverse hyperbolic sine of x is sinh−1 𝑥𝑥 = ln (𝑥𝑥 + √𝑥𝑥2 + 1) .The IV columns instrument Drilling 
Density measures by the product of the proportion of county covering a shale play and the world energy price index. County clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. −* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level. 
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A 3.3 Heterogeneous Effects with Drilling Boom and Decline Spells   
 Grade 11-12 Enrollment Count (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
BoomSpellcit  -0.0738
** -0.1180*  
 (0.0295) (0.0605)  
DeclineSpellcit  -0.0104 0.0484  
 (0.0258) (0.0775)  
BoomSpellcit * BoomDurationi  0.0094  
  (0.0075)  
DeclineSpellcit *DeclineDurationi  -0.0135  
  (0.0160)  
Duration Dummies    
 BoomDuration 3 − 4 yrsi   -0.0766* 
   (0.0409) 
 BoomDuration 5 − 6 yrsi   -0.0752* 
   (0.0444) 
BoomDuration 7 − 8 yrsi   -0.0388* 
   (0.0208) 
    BoomDuration 10 more yrsi   0.0100 
   (0.0347) 
DeclineDuration 3 − 4 yrsi   0.0118 
   (0.0338) 
DeclineDuration 5 − 7 yrsi   0.0022 
   (0.0353) 
Observations  9,452 9,452 10,294 
R2 0.319 0.319 0.320 
County FE Yes Yes Yes 
State-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Point estimates of coefficients 𝛿𝛿1  and 𝛿𝛿2 are summarized in column (1) for model 
𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜸𝜸
′𝑿𝑿𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if at least three consecutive years are boom years in a spell i within a 
county. 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if at least three consecutive years are bust years in a spell i 
within a county. Define a year as a boom (decline) year if the annual change of drilling 
density is more (less) than 10 oil/gas wells per initial 1,000 labors. 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 
(𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) is the number of years that a boom (decline) spell i lasts. 
 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 3 − 4 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 1 if a spell i lasts for 3 or 4 years. Additional Controls 
includes three sets of control variables the same as in the basic results. County clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. −* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 
percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level. 
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